Hermogenes. Suppose that we make Socrates a party to the
argument?
Cratylus.
If you please.
Her. I
should explain to you, Socrates, that our friend Cratylus has
been arguing about names; he says that they are natural and
not conventional; not a portion of the human voice which men
agree to use;
but that there is a truth or correctness
in them, which is the same for Hellenes as
for barbarians. Whereupon I ask him, whether his own name
of Cratylus is a true name or not, and he answers "Yes."
And Socrates? "Yes." Then every man's name, as I tell him,
is that which he is called. To this he replies- "If all
the world were to call you Hermogenes, that would not be
your name." And when I am anxious to have a further
explanation he is ironical and mysterious, and seems to
imply that he has a notion of his own about the matter, if
he would only tell, and could entirely convince me, if he
chose to be intelligible. Tell me, Socrates, what this
oracle means; or rather tell me, if you will be so good,
what is your own view of the truth or correctness of
names, which I would far sooner hear.
Socrates.
Son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient saying, that "hard is
the knowledge of the good." And the knowledge of names is a
great part of knowledge. If I had not been poor, I might
have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus,
which is a complete education in grammar and language- these
are his own words- and then I should have been at once able
to answer your question about the correctness of names. But,
indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and
therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I
will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the
investigation of them. When he declares that your name is
not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun
of you;-
he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes,
because you are always looking after a fortune and never
in luck.
But, as I was saying, there is a good
deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and
therefore we had better leave the question open until we
have heard both sides.
Her. I
have often talked over this matter, both with Cratylus and
others, and cannot convince myself that there is any
principle of correctness in names other than convention and
agreement; any name which you give, in my opinion, is the
right one, and if you change that and give another, the new
name is as correct as the old- we frequently change the
names of our slaves, and the newly-imposed name is as good
as the old: for there is no name given to anything by
nature; all is convention and habit of the users;- such is
my view. But if I am mistaken I shall be happy to hear and
learn of Cratylus, or of any one else.
Soc. I
dare say that you be right, Hermogenes: let us see;- Your
meaning is, that the name of each thing is only that which
anybody agrees to call it?
Her. That
is my notion.
Soc.
Whether the giver of the name be an individual or a city?
Her. Yes.
Soc.
Well, now, let me take an instance;- suppose that I call a
man a horse or a horse a man, you mean to say that a man
will be rightly called a horse by me individually, and
rightly called a man by the rest of the world; and a horse
again would be rightly called a man by me and a horse by the
world:- that is your meaning?
Her. He
would, according to my view.
Soc. But
how about truth, then? you would acknowledge that there is
in words a true and a false?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And
there are true and false propositions?
Her. To
be sure.
Soc. And
a true proposition says that which is, and a false
proposition says that which is not?
Her. Yes;
what other answer is possible?
Soc. Then
in a proposition there is a true and false?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. But
is a proposition true as a whole only, and are the parts
untrue?
Her. No;
the parts are true as well as the whole.
Soc.
Would you say the large parts and not the smaller ones, or
every part?
Her. I
should say that every part is true.
Soc. Is a
proposition resolvable into any part smaller than a name?
Her. No;
that is the smallest.
Soc. Then
the name is a part of the true proposition?
Her. Yes.
Soc. Yes,
and a true part, as you say.
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
is not the part of a falsehood also a falsehood?
Her. Yes.
Soc.
Then, if propositions may be true and false, names may be
true and false?
Her. So
we must infer.
Soc. And
the name of anything is that which any one affirms to be the
name?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
will there be so many names of each thing as everybody says
that there are? and will they be true names at the time of
uttering them?
Her. Yes,
Socrates, I can conceive no correctness of names other than
this; you give one name, and I another; and in different
cities and countries there are different
names for the same things;
Hellenes differ from barbarians in their use of names, and the several Hellenic tribes
from one another.
Soc. But
would you say, Hermogenes, that the things differ as the
names differ? and are they relative to individuals, as
Protagoras tells us? For he says that man is the measure of
all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me,
and that they are to you as they appear to you. Do you agree
with him, or would you say that things have a permanent
essence of their own?
Her.
There have been times, Socrates, when I have been driven in
my perplexity to take refuge with Protagoras; not that I
agree with him at all.
Soc.
What! have you ever been driven to admit that there was no
such thing as a bad man?
Her. No,
indeed; but I have often had reason to think that there are
very bad men, and a good many of them.
Soc.
Well, and have you ever found any very good ones?
Her. Not
many.
Soc.
Still you have found them?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
would you hold that the very good were the very wise, and
the very evil very foolish? Would that be your view?
Her. It
would.
Soc. But
if Protagoras is right, and the truth is that things are as
they appear to any one, how can some of us be wise and some
of us foolish?
Her.
Impossible.
Soc. And
if, on the other hand, wisdom and folly are really distinguishable, you will
allow, I think, that the assertion of Protagoras can hardly
be correct. For if what appears to each man is true to him,
one man cannot in reality be wiser than another.
Her. He
cannot.
Soc. Nor
will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus, that all things
equally belong to all men at the same moment and always; for
neither on his view can there be some good and other bad, if
virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all.
Her.
There cannot.
Soc. But
if neither is right, and things are not relative to
individuals, and all things do not equally belong to all at
the same moment and always, they must be supposed to have
their own proper and permanent essence: they are not in
relation to us, or influenced by us, fluctuating according
to our fancy, but they are independent, and maintain to
their own essence the relation prescribed by nature.
Her. I
think, Socrates, that you have said the truth.
Soc. Does
what I am saying apply only to the things themselves, or
equally to the actions which proceed from them? Are not
actions also a class of being?
Her. Yes,
the actions are real as well as the things.
Soc. Then
the actions also are done according to their proper nature,
and not according to our opinion of them? In cutting, for
example, we do not cut as we please, and with any chance
instrument; but we cut with the proper instrument only, and
according to the natural process of cutting; and the natural
process is right and will succeed, but any other will fail
and be of no use at all.
Her. I
should say that the natural way is the right way.
Soc.
Again, in burning, not every way is the right way; but the
right way is the natural way, and the right instrument the
natural instrument.
Her.
True.
Soc. And
this holds good of all actions?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
speech is a kind of action?
Her.
True.
Soc. And
will a man speak correctly who speaks as he pleases?
Will not the successful speaker
rather be he who speaks in the natural
way
of speaking,
and as things ought to be spoken, and with the natural
instrument?
Any other mode of speaking will result in error and failure.
Her. I
quite agree with you.
Soc. And
is not naming a part of speaking? for in giving names men
speak.
Her. That
is true.
Soc. And
if speaking is a sort of action and has a relation to acts,
is not naming also a sort of action?
Her.
True.
Soc. And
we saw that actions were not relative to ourselves, but had
a special nature of their own?
Her.
Precisely.
Soc. Then
the argument would lead us to infer that names ought to be
given according to a natural process, and with a proper
instrument, and not at our pleasure: in this and no other
way shall we name with success.
Her. I
agree.
Soc. But
again, that which has to be cut has to be cut with
something?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
that which has to be woven or pierced has to be woven or
pierced with something?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And
that which has to be named has to be named with something?
Her.
True.
Soc. What
is that with which we pierce?
Her. An
awl.
Soc. And
with which we weave?
Her. A
shuttle.
Soc. And
with which we name?
Her. A
name.
Soc. Very
good: then a name is an instrument?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc.
Suppose that I ask, "What sort of instrument is a shuttle?"
And you answer, "A weaving instrument."
Her.
Well.
Soc. And
I ask again, "What do we do when we weave?"- The answer is,
that we separate or disengage the warp from the woof.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And
may not a similar description be given of an awl, and of
instruments in general?
Her. To
be sure.
Soc. And
now suppose that I ask a similar question about names: will
you answer me? Regarding the name as an instrument, what do
we do when we name?
Her. I
cannot say.
Soc. Do
we not give information to one another, and distinguish
things according to their natures?
Her.
Certainly we do.
Soc. Then
a name is an instrument of teaching and of distinguishing
natures, as the shuttle is of distinguishing the threads of
the web.
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
the shuttle is the instrument of the weaver?
Her.
Assuredly.
Soc. Then
the weaver will use the shuttle well- and well means like a
weaver? and the teacher will use the name well- and well
means like a teacher?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
when the weaver uses the shuttle, whose work will he be
using well?
Her. That
of the carpenter.
Soc. And
is every man a carpenter, or the skilled only?
Her. Only
the skilled.
Soc. And
when the piercer uses the awl, whose work will he be using
well?
Her. That
of the smith.
Soc. And
is every man a smith, or only the skilled?
Her. The
skilled only.
Soc. And
when the teacher uses the name, whose work will he be using?
Her.
There again I am puzzled.
Soc.
Cannot you at least say who gives us the names which we use?
Her.
Indeed I cannot.
Soc. Does
not the law seem to you to give us them?
Her. Yes,
I suppose so.
Soc. Then
the teacher, when he gives us a name, uses the work of the
legislator?
Her. I
agree.
Soc. And
is every man a legislator, or the skilled only?
Her. The
skilled only.
Soc.
Then, Hermogenes, not every man is able to give a name, but
only a maker of names; and this is the legislator, who of
all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest.
Her.
True.
Soc. And
how does the legislator make names? and to what does he
look? Consider this in the light of the previous instances:
to what does the carpenter look in making the shuttle? Does
he not look to that which is naturally fitted to act as a
shuttle?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And
suppose the shuttle to be broken in making, will he make
another, looking to the broken one? or will he look to the
form according to which he made the other?
Her. To
the latter, I should imagine.
Soc.
Might not that be justly called the true or ideal shuttle?
Her. I
think so.
SOC. And
whatever shuttles are wanted, for the manufacture of
garments, thin or thick, of flaxen, woollen, or other
material, ought all of them to have the true form of the
shuttle; and whatever is the shuttle best adapted to each
kind of work, that ought to be the form which the maker
produces in each case.
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
the same holds of other instruments: when a man has
discovered the instrument which is naturally adapted to each
work, he must express this natural form, and not others
which he fancies, in the material, whatever it may be, which
he employs; for example, he ought to know how to put into
iron the forms of awls adapted by nature to their several
uses?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And
how to put into wood forms of shuttles adapted by nature to
their uses?
Her.
True.
Soc. For
the several forms of shuttles naturally answer to the
several kinds of webs; and this is true of instruments in
general.
Her. Yes.
Soc.
Then, as to names: ought not our legislator also to know how
to put the true natural names of each thing into sounds and
syllables and to make and give all names with a view to the
ideal name, if he is to be a namer in any true sense? And we
must remember that different legislators will not use the
same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he
may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make
them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but
the material may vary, and still the instrument may be
equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in
a foreign country;- there is no difference.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And
the legislator, whether he be Hellene
or barbarian, is not
therefore to be deemed by you a worse legislator, provided
he gives the true and proper form of the name in whatever
syllables; this or that country makes no matter.
Her.
Quite true.
Soc. But
who then is to determine whether the proper form is given to
the shuttle, whatever sort of wood may be used? the
carpenter who makes, or the weaver who is to use them?
Her. I
should say, he who is to use them, Socrates.
Soc. And
who uses the work of the
lyremaker? Will not he be
the man who knows how to direct what is being done, and who
will know also whether the work is being well done or not?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And
who is he?
Her. The
player of the lyre.
Soc. And
who will direct the shipwright?
Her. The
pilot.
Soc. And
who will be best able to direct the legislator in his work,
and will know whether the work is well done, in this or any
other country? Will not the user be the man?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
this is he who knows how to ask questions?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
how to answer them?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
him who knows how to ask and answer you would call a
dialectician?
Her. Yes;
that would be his name.
Soc. Then
the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder, and the pilot
has to direct him, if the rudder is to be well made.
Her.
True.
Soc. And
the work of the legislator is to give names, and the
dialectician must be his director if the names are to be
rightly given?
Her. That
is true.
Soc.
Then, Hermogenes, I should say that this giving of names can
be no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of light
or chance persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that
things have names by nature, and that not every man is an
artificer of names, but he only who looks to the name which
each thing by nature has, and is able to express the true
forms of things in letters and syllables.
Her. I
cannot answer you, Socrates; but I find a difficulty in
changing my opinion all in a moment, and I think that I
should be more readily persuaded, if you would show me what
this is which you term the natural fitness of names.
Soc. My
good Hermogenes, I have none to show. Was I not telling you
just now (but you have forgotten), that I knew nothing, and
proposing to share the enquiry with you? But now that you
and I have talked over the matter, a step has been gained;
for we have discovered that names have by nature a truth,
and that not every man knows how to give a thing a name.
Her. Very
good.
Soc. And
what is the nature of this truth or correctness of names?
That, if you care to know, is the next question.
Her.
Certainly, I care to know.
Soc. Then
reflect.
Her. How
shall I reflect?
Soc. The
true way is to have the assistance of those who know, and you must pay them well both in money and in
thanks;
these are the Sophists, of
whom your brother, Callias, has- rather dearly- bought the
reputation of wisdom. But you have not yet come into your
inheritance, and therefore you had better go to him, and
beg and entreat him to tell you what he has learnt from
Protagoras about the fitness of names.
Her. But
how inconsistent should I be, if, whilst repudiating
Protagoras and his Truth, I were to attach any value to what
he and his book affirm!
Soc. Then
if you despise him, you must learn of Homer and the poets.
Her. And
where does Homer say anything about names, and what does he
say?
Soc. He
often speaks of them; notably and nobly in the places where
he distinguishes the different names which Gods and men give
to the same things. Does he not in these passages make a
remarkable statement about the correctness of names? For the
Gods must clearly be supposed to call things by their right
and natural names; do you not think so?
Her. Why,
of course they call them rightly, if they call them at all.
But to what are you referring?
Soc. Do
you not know what he says about the river in Troy who had a
single combat with Hephaestus?
Whom the Gods call Xanthus, and men call
Scamander.
Her. I
remember.
Soc.
Well, and about this river- to know that he ought to be
called Xanthus and not Scamander- is not that a solemn
lesson? Or about the bird which, as he says,
The Gods call Chalcis, and men Cymindis: to be taught how much more
correct the name Chalcis is than the name Cymindis- do you deem
that a light matter? Or about Batieia and Myrina? And there
are many other observations of the same kind in Homer and
other poets. Now, I think that this is beyond the
understanding of you and me; but the names of Scamandrius
and Astyanax, which he affirms to have been the names of
Hector's son, are more within the range of human faculties,
as I am disposed to think; and what the poet means by
correctness may be more readily apprehended in that
instance: you will remember I dare say the lines to which I
refer?
Her. I
do.
Soc. Let
me ask you, then, which did Homer think the more correct of
the names given to Hector's son- Astyanax or Scamandrius?
Her. I do
not know.
Soc. How
would you answer, if you were asked whether the wise or the
unwise are more likely to give correct names?
Her. I
should say the wise, of course.
Soc. And
are the men or the women of a city, taken as a class, the
wiser?
Her. I
should say, the men.
Soc. And
Homer, as you know, says that the Trojan men called him
Astyanax (king of the city); but if the men called him
Astyanax, the other name of Scamandrius could only have been
given to him by the women.
Her. That
may be inferred.
Soc. And
must not Homer have imagined the Trojans to be wiser than
their wives?
Her. To
be sure.
Soc. Then
he must have thought Astyanax to be a more correct name for
the boy than Scamandrius?
Her.
Clearly.
Soc. And
what is the reason of this? Let us consider:- does he not
himself suggest a very good reason, when he says,
For he alone defended their city and long
walls? This appears to be a good reason for calling the son
of the saviour king of the city which his father was saving,
as Homer observes.
Her. I
see.
Soc. Why,
Hermogenes, I do not as yet see myself; and do you?
Her. No,
indeed; not I.
Soc. But
tell me, friend, did not Homer himself also give Hector his
name?
Her. What
of that?
Soc. The
name appears to me to be very nearly the same as the name of
Astyanax- both are Hellenic; and a king (anax) and a holder
(ektor) have nearly the same meaning, and are both
descriptive of a king; for a man is clearly the holder of
that of which he is king; he rules, and owns, and holds it.
But, perhaps, you may think that I am talking nonsense; and
indeed I believe that I myself did not know what I meant
when I imagined that I had found some indication of the
opinion of Homer about the correctness of names.
Her. I
assure you that I think otherwise, and I believe you to be
on the right track.
Soc.
There is reason, I think, in calling the lion's whelp a
lion, and the foal of a horse a horse; I am speaking only of
the ordinary course of nature, when an animal produces after
his kind, and not of extraordinary births;- if contrary to
nature a horse have a calf, then I should not call that a
foal but a calf; nor do I call any inhuman birth a man, but
only a natural birth. And the same may be said of trees and other
things. Do you agree with me?
Her. Yes,
I agree.
Soc. Very
good. But you had better watch me and see that I do not play
tricks with you. For on the same principle the son of a king
is to be called a king. And whether the syllables of the
name are the same or not the same, makes no difference,
provided the meaning is retained; nor does the addition or
subtraction of a letter make any difference so long as the
essence of the thing remains in possession of the name and
appears in it.
Her. What
do you mean?
Soc. A
very simple matter. I may illustrate my meaning by the names
of letters, which you know are not the same as the letters
themselves with the exception of the four e, u, o (short), o
(long); the names of the rest, whether vowels or consonants,
are made up of other letters which we add to them; but so
long as we introduce the meaning, and there can be no
mistake, the name of the letter is quite correct. Take, for
example, the letter beta- the addition of e, t, a, gives no
offence, and does not prevent the whole name from having the
value which the legislator intended- so well did he know how
to give the letters names.
Her. I
believe you are right.
Soc. And
may not the same be said of a king? a king will often be the
son of a king, the good son or the noble son of a good or
noble sire; and similarly the off spring of every kind, in
the regular course of nature, is like the parent, and
therefore has the same name. Yet the syllables may be
disguised until they appear different to the ignorant
person, and he may not recognize them, although they are the
same, just as any one of us would not recognize the same
drugs under different disguises of colour and smell,
although to the physician, who regards the power of them,
they are the same, and he is not put out by the addition;
and in like manner the etymologist is not put out by the addition or
transposition or subtraction of a letter or two, or indeed
by the change of all the letters, for this need not
interfere with the meaning. As was just now said, the names
of Hector and Astyanax have only one letter alike, which is
t, and yet they have the same meaning. And how little in
common with the letters of their names has Archepolis
(ruler of the city)- and yet the meaning is the same. And
there are many other names which just mean "king." Again,
there are several names for a general, as, for example, Agis (leader)
and Polemarchus (chief in war) and Eupolemus (good
warrior); and others which denote a physician, as Iatrocles
(famous healer) and Acesimbrotus (curer of mortals); and there are many others
which might be cited, differing in their syllables and
letters, but having the same meaning. Would you not say so?
Her. Yes.
Soc. The
same names, then, ought to be assigned to those who follow
in the course of nature?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
what of those who follow out of the course of nature, and
are prodigies? for example, when a good and religious man
has an irreligious son, he ought to bear the name not of his
father, but of the class to which he belongs, just as in the
case which was before supposed of a horse foaling a calf.
Her.
Quite true.
Soc. Then
the irreligious son of a religious father should be called
irreligious?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. He
should not be called Theophilus (beloved of God) or Mnesitheus (mindful of God),
or any of these names: if names are correctly given, his
should have an opposite meaning.
Her.
Certainly, Socrates.
Soc.
Again, Hermogenes, there is Orestes (the man of the mountains) who appears to be
rightly called; whether chance gave the name, or perhaps
some poet who meant to express the brutality and fierceness
and mountain wildness of his hero's nature.
Her. That
is very likely, Socrates.
Soc. And
his father's name is also according to nature.
Her.
Clearly.
Soc. Yes,
for as his name, so also is his nature; Agamemnon
(admirable for remaining) is one who is patient and
persevering in the accomplishment of his resolves, and by
his virtue crowns them; and his continuance at Troy with all
the vast army is a proof of that admirable endurance in him
which is signified by the name Agamemnon. I also think that Atreus is
rightly called; for his murder of Chrysippus and
his exceeding cruelty to Thyestes are damaging and destructive to his
reputation- the name is a little altered and disguised so as
not to be intelligible to every one, but to the etymologist
there is no difficulty in seeing the meaning, for whether
you think of him as ateires the stubborn, or as atrestos the
fearless, or as ateros the destructive one, the name is
perfectly correct in every point of view. And I think that Pelops is also
named appropriately; for, as the name implies, he is rightly
called Pelops who sees what is near only (o ta pelas oron).
Her. How
so?
Soc.
Because, according to the tradition, he had no forethought
or foresight of all the evil which the murder of Myrtilus
would entail upon his whole race in remote ages; he saw only
what was at hand and immediate,- Or in other words, pelas
(near), in his eagerness to win Hippodamia by
all means for his bride. Every one would agree that the name
of Tantalus is rightly given and in accordance with nature,
if the traditions about him are true.
Her. And
what are the traditions?
Soc. Many
terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his
life- last of all, came the utter ruin of his country; and
after his death he had the stone suspended (talanteia) over
his head in the world below- all this agrees wonderfully
well with his name. You might imagine that some person who
wanted to call him Talantatos (the most weighted down by misfortune),
disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into
this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually
been transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, has also an
excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because
really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for
some call him Zena, and use the one half, and others who use
the other half call him Dia; the two together signify the
nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were
saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is
more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and
king of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and
Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the God
through whom all creatures always have life (di on zen aei
pasi tois zosin uparchei).
There is an irreverence, at first sight,
in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for
stupidity), and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child
of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact; for this is the
meaning of his father's name: Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to
sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai
acheraton tou nou, the pure
and garnished mind (sc. apo
tou chorein). He, as we are informed by tradition, was
begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (apo tou oran ta ano) from
looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the way
to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If
I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone
on and tried more conclusions of the same sort on the
remoter ancestors of the Gods,- then I might have seen
whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant,
I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.
Her. You
seem to me, Socrates, to be quite like a prophet newly
inspired, and to be uttering oracles.
Soc. Yes,
Hermogenes, and I believe that I caught the inspiration from
the great Euthyphro of the Prospaltian deme, who gave me a
long lecture which commenced at dawn: he talked and I
listened, and his wisdom and enchanting ravishment has not only filled my ears but taken
possession of my soul, and to-day I shall let his superhuman
power work and finish the investigation of names- that will
be the way; but to-morrow, if you are so disposed, we will
conjure him away, and make a purgation of him, if we can
only find some priest or sophist who is skilled in purifications
of this sort.
Her. With
all my heart; for am very curious to hear the rest of the
enquiry about names.
Soc. Then
let us proceed; and where would you have us begin, now that
we have got a sort of outline of the enquiry? Are there any
names which witness of themselves that they are not given
arbitrarily, but have a natural fitness? The names of heroes
and of men in general are apt to be deceptive because they
are often called after ancestors with whose names, as we
were saying, they may have no business; or they are the
expression of a wish like Eutychides (the son of good fortune), or Sosias (the
Saviour), or Theophilus (the beloved of God), and others. But I think
that we had better leave these, for there will be more
chance of finding correctness in the names of immutable
essences;- there ought to have been more care taken about
them when they were named, and perhaps there may have been
some more than human power at work occasionally in giving
them names.
Her. I
think so, Socrates.
Soc.
Ought we not to begin with the consideration of the Gods,
and show that they are" rightly named Gods?
Her. Yes,
that will be well.
Soc. My
notion would be something of this sort:- I suspect that the
sun,
moon, earth, stars, and heaven, which are still the Gods of many barbarians, were the only Gods known to the aboriginal Hellenes. Seeing that they were always moving and
running, from their running nature they were called Gods or runners
(Theous, Theontas); and when men became acquainted with the
other Gods, they proceeded to apply the same name to them
all. Do you think that likely?
Her. I
think it very likely indeed.
Soc. What
shall follow the Gods?
Her. Must
not demons and heroes and men come next?
Soc.
Demons! And what do you consider to be the meaning of this
word? Tell me if my view is right.
Her. Let
me hear.
Soc. You
know how Hesiod uses the word?
Her. I do
not.
Soc. Do
you not remember that he speaks of a golden race of men who
came first?
Her. Yes,
I do.
Soc. He
says of them-
But now that fate has closed over this
race
They are holy demons upon the earth,
Beneficent, averters of ills, guardians of mortal men.
Her. What
is the inference?
Soc. What
is the inference! Why, I suppose that he means by the golden
men, not men literally made of gold, but good and noble; and
I am convinced of this, because he further says that we are
the iron race.
Her. That
is true.
Soc. And
do you not suppose that good men of our own day would by him
be said to be of golden race?
Her. Very
likely.
Soc. And
are not the good wise?
Her. Yes,
they are wise.
Soc. And
therefore I have the most entire conviction that he called them demons, because they were daemones
(knowing or wise), and in our
older Attic dialect
the word itself occurs. Now he and other poets say truly,
that when a good man dies he has honour and a mighty portion
among the dead, and becomes a
demon;
which is a name given to him signifying wisdom. And I say too, that every wise man who
happens to be a good man is more than human
(daimonion) both in life and death, and is rightly called
a demon.
Her. Then
I rather think that I am of one
mind with you; but what is
the meaning of the word "hero"? (eros)
Soc. I
think that there is no difficulty in explaining, for the
name is not much altered, and signifies that they were born
of love.
Her. What
do you mean?
Soc. Do
you not know that the heroes are demigods?
Her. What
then?
Soc. All of them sprang either from
the love of a God for a mortal woman, or of a mortal man for
a Goddess; think of the word in the old Attic, and you will
see better that the name heros is only a slight alteration of Eros, from whom the heroes sprang:
either this is the meaning, or, if not this, then they must
have been skilful as rhetoricians and dialecticians, and able to put the question
(erotan), for eirein is equivalent to legein.
And therefore, as I was
saying, in the Attic dialect the heroes turn out to be rhetoricians and questioners. All this is
easy enough; the noble breed of heroes are a tribe of sophists and
rhetors.
But can you tell me why men are called anthropoi?- that is more difficult.
Her. No,
I cannot; and I would not try even if I could, because I
think that you are the more likely to succeed.
Soc. That
is to say, you trust to the inspiration of Euthyphro.
Her. Of
course.
Soc. Your
faith is not vain; for at this very moment a new and
ingenious thought strikes me, and, if I am not careful,
before tomorrow's dawn I shall be wiser than I ought to be.
Now, attend to me; and first, remember that we of put in and
pull out letters in words, and give names as we please and
change the accents. Take, for example, the word Dii Philos; in
order to convert this from a sentence into a noun, we omit
one of the iotas and sound the middle syllable grave instead
of acute; as, on the other hand, letters are sometimes
inserted in words instead of being omitted, and the acute
takes the place of the grave.
Her. That
is true.
Soc. The
name anthropos, which was once a sentence, and is now a noun, appears
to be a case just of this sort, for one letter, which is the
a, has been omitted, and the acute on the last syllable has
been changed to a grave.
Her. What
do you mean?
Soc. I
mean to say that the word "man" implies that other animals never examine, or consider, or look up at
what they see, but that man
not only sees (opope) but considers and looks up at that
which he sees,
and hence he alone of all animals is
rightly anthropos, meaning anathron a opopen.
Her. May
I ask you to examine another word about which I am curious?
Soc.
Certainly.
Her. I
will take that which appears to me to follow next in order.
You know the distinction of soul and body?
Soc. Of
course.
Her. Let
us endeavour to analyze them like the previous words.
Soc. You
want me first of all to examine the natural fitness of the
word psnche (soul), and then of the word soma (body)?
Her. Yes.
Soc. If I
am to say what occurs to me at the moment, I should imagine
that those
who first use the name psnche meant
to express that the soul when in the body is the source of life,
and gives the power
of breath and revival (anapsuchon),
and when this reviving power fails then the body perishes
and dies, and this, if I am not mistaken, they called psyche.
But please stay a moment; I fancy that I
can discover something which will be more acceptable to
the disciples of Euthyphro, for I am afraid that they will
scorn this explanation. What do you say to another?
Her. Let
me hear.
Soc. What
is that which holds and carries and gives life and motion to
the entire nature of the body? What else but the soul?
Her. Just
that.
Soc. And
do you not believe with Anaxagoras, that mind or soul is
the ordering and containing principle of all things?
Her. Yes;
I do.
Soc. Then
you may well call that power phuseche which carries and holds nature (e
phusin okei, kai ekei), and this may be refined away into psuche.
Her.
Certainly; and this derivation is, I think, more scientific
than the other.
Soc. It
is so; but I cannot help laughing, if I am to suppose that
this was the true meaning of the name.
Her. But
what shall we say of the next word?
Soc. You
mean soma (the body).
Her. Yes.
Soc. That
may be variously interpreted; and yet more variously if a little
permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (sema) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our
present life;
or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to
(semainei) the body;
probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were
under the impression that the soul is suffering the
punishment of sin,
and that the body is an enclosure or
prison in which the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (soma,
sozetai), as the name ooma implies, until the penalty is paid;
according to this view, not even a letter of the word need
be changed.
Her. I
think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of
words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the
Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like
to know whether any similar principle of correctness is to
be applied to them.
Soc. Yes,
indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle
which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,- that of the
Gods we know nothing, either of their natures or of the
names which they give themselves; but we are sure that the
names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be,
are true. And this is the best of all principles; and the
next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them
by any sort of kind names or patronymics which they like,
because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is
a very good custom, and one which I should much wish to
observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the first place
announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do
not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring
about the meaning of men in giving them these names,- in
this there can be small blame.
Her. I
think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like
to do as you say.
Soc.
Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?
Her. Yes,
that will be very proper.
Soc. What
may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?
Her. That
is another and certainly a most difficult question.
Soc. My
dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely
have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and
had a good deal to say.
Her.
Well, and what of them?
Soc. They
are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of
names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning
is still discernible. For example, that which we term ousia
is by some called esia, and by others again osia. Now that
the essence of things should be called estia, which is
akin to the first of these (esia = estia), is rational enough. And there is
reason in the Athenians calling that estia which
participates in ousia. For in ancient times we too seem to have said
esia
for ousia, and this you may note to have been the idea
of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first
offered to estia, which was natural enough if they meant
that estia was the essence of things. Those again who read osia seem to
have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus, that all things
flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle (othoun) is the
cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore
rightly called osia. Enough of this, which is all that we
who know nothing can affirm.
Next in order after Hestia we ought to
consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has
been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking
great nonsense.
Her. Why,
Socrates?
Soc. My
good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.
Her. Of
what nature?
Soc.
Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.
Her. How
plausible?
Soc. I
fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old
as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also
spoke.
Her. How
do you mean?
Soc.
Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest; he compares them to the stream of a river,
and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.
Her. That
is true.
Soc.
Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the
names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods,
agreed pretty much in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the
giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the
line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells
of
Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother
Tethys. And again, Orpheus says, that
The fair river
of
Ocean was the first to
marry, and he espoused his sister Tethys, who
was his mother's daughter. You see that this is a
remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of
Heracleitus.
Her. I
think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but
I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.
Soc.
Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of
a spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and
filtered (diattomenon,
ethoumenon) may be likened
to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these two
words.
Her. The
idea is ingenious, Socrates.
Soc. To
be sure. But what comes next?- of Zeus we have spoken.
Her. Yes.
Soc. Then
let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto,
whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.
Her. By
all means.
Soc.
Poseidon is Posidesmos, the chain of the feet; the original
inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element
in his walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he
called the ruler of this element Poseidon; the e was
probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but
the name may have been originally written with a double l
and not with an s, meaning that the God knew many things (Polla eidos).
And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been
named from shaking (seiein), and then p and d have been added.
Pluto gives wealth (Ploutos), and his name means the giver
of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in
general appear to imagine that the term Hades is
connected with the invisible (aeides) and so they are led by their fears to
call the God Pluto instead.
Her. And
what is the true derivation?
Soc. In
spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this
deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such
as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the
soul denuded of the body going to him, my belief is that all
is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the God
really correspond.
Her. Why,
how is that?
Soc. I
will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to
ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger?
and which confines him more to the same spot,- desire or
necessity?
Her.
Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.
Soc. And
do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if
he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of
chains?
Her.
Assuredly they would.
Soc. And
if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I
should certainly infer, and not by necessity?
Her. That
is clear.
Soc. And
there are many desires?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the
greatest?
Her. Yes.
Soc. And
is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be
made better by associating with another?
Her.
Certainly not.
Soc. And
is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing
to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been
laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words.
And, according to this view, he is the
perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants
of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth he
sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more
than he wants down there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the
rich).
Note also, that he will have nothing to
do with men while they are in the body, but only when the
soul is liberated from the
desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and
reflection in that; for in their liberated state he can
bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are
flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos
himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own
far-famed chains.
Her.
There is a deal of truth in what you say.
Soc. Yes,
Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from
the unseen (aeides)- far otherwise, but from his knowledge (eidenai) of all
noble things.
Her. Very
good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?
Soc. Demeter is e
didousa meter, who gives food like a mother; Here is the
lovely one (erate)- for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married
her; possibly also the name may have been given when the
legislator was thinking of the heavens,
and may be only a disguise of the air (aer),
putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will
recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters of
Here several times over.
People dread the name of Pherephatta as they dread the name of Apollo- and
with as little reason; the fear, if I am not mistaken, only
arises from their ignorance of the nature of names.
But they go changing the name into Phersephone,
and they are terrified at this;
whereas the new name means only that the
Goddess is wise (sophe); for seeing that all things in the world
are in motion (pheromenon), that principle which embraces and touches
and is able to follow them, is wisdom.
And therefore the Goddess may be truly
called Pherepaphe (Pherepapha), or some name like it, because
she touches that which is (tou pheromenon ephaptomene),
herein showing her wisdom.
And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her , because
she is wise. They alter her name (Core) into
Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. See Clement of Alexandria
There is the other name, Apollo, which,
as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible
signification. Have you remarked this fact?
Her. To
be sure I have, and what you say is true.
Soc. But
the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the
power of the God.
Her. How
so?
[405a] Soc. I will
endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any single
name could have been better adapted to express the
attributes of the God, embracing and in a manner signifying
all four of them,- music, and prophecy, and medicine, and archery.
Her. That must be a strange name,
and I should like to hear the explanation.
Soc. Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony.
In the first
place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use,
and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to
make a man pure both in body and soul.
Her. Very
true.
And there came out of
the smoke locusts upon the earth: and unto
them was given power, as the scorpions of the earth have power. Rev
9:3
Akris (g200)ak-rece'; appar.
from the same as 206: a locust (as pointed, or as lighting on the top of
vegetation): - locust.
Akroaterion (g201)
ak-ro-at-ay'-ree-on; from 202; an audience-room: - place of hearing.
Akrobustia (g203)
ak-rob-oos-tee'-ah; from 206 and prob. a modified form
of posthe, (the penis or male sexual organ); the prepuce;
by impl. an uncircumcised (i.e. gentile, fig.
unregenerate) state or person: - not circumcised,
uncircumcised [with 2192], uncircumcision
Akron (b206) ak'-ron; neut. of
an adj. prob. akin to the base of 188; the extremity:
- one end . . . other, tip, top, uttermost part.
And they had a king over
them, which is the angel of the bottomless pit, whose name in the Hebrew
tongue is Abaddon, but in the Greek tongue
hath his name Apollyon. Rev 9:11
Akroates (g202) ak-ro-at-ace'; from
akroaomai , (to listen; appar. an intens. of 191); a hearer (merely): - hearer
(For not the hearers of the law are just before
God, but the
doers of the law shall be justified. Ro.2:13
Soc. Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the physician who
orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier);
Or: Soc. Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the physician who
orders them, he may be rightly called Apolouon (purifier); or
or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and
sincerity,
which is the same as
truth, he may be most fitly called Aplos, from aplous (sincere), as in the
Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him Aplos;
also he is Ballon (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses;
And they had a king over them, which is the
angel of the bottomless pit, whose name in the Hebrew
tongue is Abaddon, but in the Greek tongue
hath his name Apollyon. Re.9:11
Apolluon (g623) ap-ol-loo'-ohn;
act. part. of 622; a destroyer (i.e. Satan): - Apollyon.
Apollumi (g622) ap-ol'-loo-mee;
from 575 and the base of 3639; to destroy fully (reflex.
to perish, or lose), lit. or fig.: - destroy, die, lose,
mar, perish.
or again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in akolouthos, and akoitis, and in many other words the a is supposed to
mean "together," so the meaning of the name Apollo will be
"moving together,"
whether in the poles of heaven
as they are called, or in the harmony
of song, which is termed concord,
because he moves all together
by an harmonious power, as astronomers and
musicians ingeniously declare.
"But their most notable
subtlety is that in which they speculate on the name of Acolyte, calling him Ceroferarius, a magical term, I presume, one
certainly unknown to all nations and tongues; "akolouthos", in Greek, meaning simply attendant.
Were I to stop and
seriously refute these things, I might myself justly be
laughed at, so frivolous are they and ludicrous. Calvin's Institute On the Mass.
And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in the words akolouthos and akoitis the a is substituted for an o,
so the name Apollon is equivalent to omopolon;
only the second l is
added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (apolon).
Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who do not consider
the true value of the name, which, as I was saying just now,
has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the everdarting, the purifier, the mover together (aplous,
aei Ballon, apolouon, omopolon).
The name of the Muses and of music would seem to be derived
from their making
philosophical enquiries (mosthai);
|
Cratylus
in another translation 405a
[405a] for no single
name could more aptly indicate the four functions
of the god, touching upon them all and in a manner
declaring his power in music, prophecy, medicine,
and archery.
Hermogenes
Go on; you seem to imply that it is a remarkable
name.
Socrates
His name and nature are in harmony;
- you see he is a musical god. For in the first place, purification and purgations used in medicine and in soothsaying, and fumigations with medicinal and magic drugs,
mantikos ,
ē, on, A
prophetic, oracular, “kleos” A.Ag.1098;
m. mukhoi, thronoi, Id.Eu.180,616;
“tekhnē” 2.
[select] tekhnē m. faculty of
divination, prophecy, hē . . m. hē tou daimoniou, of
Socrates, Pl.Ap.40a:
also in Pl., “mantikēn Apollōn anēuren” Smp.197a;
“m. entheos” Phdr.244b,
cf. Th.5.103.
entheos ,
on, in later
Prose contr. enthous Ph.2.542, App.Hisp.18,
Aen.Gaz.Thphr.p.12
B.:—
A.full
of the god, inspired, possessed, e. gunaikes, of
the Bacchantes, S.Ant.964
(lyr.); e. Arei possessed
by him, A.Th.497;
“ ek Panos” E.Hipp.141;
“ hupo tou erōtos” X.Smp.1.10:
c. gen. rei, “ tekhnēs nin Zeus entheon ktisas phrena” A.Eu.17;
also e. pros aretēn inspired
with a love for it, Pl.Smp.179a:
Sup. -ōtatē, phusis, of
Homer, Max.
Tyr. 32.4.
[405b] and the
baths and sprinklings connected with that sort
of thing all have the single function of making
a man pure in body and soul, do they not?
-
Pharmakon 3. enchanted
potion, philtre: hence, charm, spell,
Od.4.220
sq., Ar.Pl.302,
Theoc.2.15,
PSI1.64.20
(i B. C.); “pharmakois ton andr' emēnen” Ar.Th.561;
toiauta ekhō ph. such charms
have I, Hdt.3.85,
cf. Apoc.9.21.
pharma^kos
(on the accent v. Hdn.Gr.1.150),
ho, hē,
A.
poisoner, sorcerer, magician,
LXXEx.7.11
(masc.), Ma.3.5
(fem.), Apoc.21.8,
22.15.
pharmakos
[v. ad fin.], ho,
A
one sacrificed or executed
as an atonement or purification
for others, scapegoat, Hippon.5, al.,
Ar.Ra.733
(troch.), Ister 33;
and, since criminals were reserved for
this fate, a general name of reproach, Ar.Eq.1405,
Lys.6.53,
Call. in Diēgēseis
ii 29, D.
25.80. [ a_ Hippon. and Call., a^ Ar.Eq.
l.c.; on the accent v. Hdn. Gr. 1.150; “ pharmakos”
Did. ap.
Harp.]
Hermogenes: Certainly.
Socrates :But this is
the god who purifies and washes away (apaloouōn) and
delivers (apoluōn) from such
evils, is he not?
Hermogenes: Certainly.
Socrates: With reference, then, to his acts
of delivering and his washings, [405c] as being
the physician of such diseases, he might
properly be called Apoluon (apalouôn, the washer), and with reference to soothsaying and truth and simplicity--for the
two are identical--he might most properly be
called by the name the Thessalians use; for all
Thessalians call the god Aplun. And because he is always by his archery controller of darts (bolôn) he is ever darting (aei ballôn).
- And with reference to music we have to understand that alpha often signifies "together," and
here it denotes moving together in the heavens
about the poles, as we call them, and harmony in song, [405d] which is called concord; for, as the ingenious musicians and astronomers tell us, all these things move
together by a kind of harmony.
And this god directs the harmony, making them all move together,
among both gods and men; and so, just as we call
the homokeleuthon (him who accompanies),
- and homokoitin (bedfellow), by changing the homo to alpha, akolouthon and akoitin,so
also we called him Apollo who was Homopolo, [405e] and the second lambda was inserted,
- because without it the name
sounded of disaster (apolô, apolôla, etc.). Even as it is, some have
a suspicion of this, because they do not
properly regard the force of the name, and
therefore they fear it, thinking that it
denotes some kind of ruin. But in fact, as was
said,
DEFINITION OF WORDS:
Mainas ,
ados, hê, ( [mainomai]
) (Paul said they will think you
are a MAINOMAI if you speak in tongues)
A. raving, frantic, lussa v. l. in
S.Fr.941.4; bakchê
E.Ba.915 .
2. as Subst., MAD WOMEN, esp. Bacchante,
Maenad, mainadi
of the Furies,
A.Eu.500 (lyr.); of Cassandra,
E.Tr. 173 (lyr.).
AN EXAMPLE OF MANIAS
Pind. P. 4 Aphrodite of Cyprus
brought the maddening bird to men for the first
time, and she taught the son of Aeson skill in
prayerful incantations,
so
that he could rob Medea of reverence for her
parents,
and
a longing for Greece
would lash her, her mind on fire, with the whip of
Persuasion
THE WORD
kathar-sis , eōs, h(, Elean kotharsis Schwyzer 412, *A. [select]
cleansing from guilt or
defilement, purification, Hdt.1.35,
cleansing of the universe by fire
AN EXAMPLE OF KATHARSIS
Aristot.
Poet.
1449b
it represents men in action and does not
use narrative,
and
through pity and fear it effects relief to these
and similar emotions.
By
"language enriched" I mean that which has rhythm
and tune, i.e., song,
and by
"the kinds separately" I mean that some effects
are produced by verse alone and some again by
song.
THE WOD
katharmos ,
o(, (kathairō) A. cleansing,
purification, from guilt, purificatory
offering, atonement, expiation, iatr-ikos pharmakon
such
charms have I, Hdt.3.85,
cf. Apoc.9.21.
Pharmakeåia (g5331) far-mak-i'-ah; from
5332; medication ("pharmacy"), i.e. (by extens.)
magic (lit. or fig.): - sorcery, witchcraft.
AN EXAMPLE OF KATHARSIS OR
PHARMAKON
And the fruits that thy soul lusted after are departed from thee, and all
things which were dainty and goodly are departed
from thee, and thou shalt find them no more at
all. Rev 18:14
And the voice of harpers, and musicians, and of pipers, and trumpeters, shall be heard no more at all
in thee; and no craftsman, of whatsoever craft he be,
shall be found any more in thee; and the sound
of a millstone shall be heard no more at all in
thee; Rev 18:22
And the light of a candle shall shine no more at all in
thee; and the voice of the bridegroom and of the
bride shall be heard no more at all in thee:
for thy merchants were
the great men of the earth;
for by thy SORCERIS
were all nations
deceived.
Re.18:23
Emporos (g1713) em'-por-os; from 1722
and the base of 4198; a (wholesale) tradesman: -
merchant.
|
Koite (g2845) koy'-tay; from
2749; a couch; by extens. cohabitation; by impl. the
male sperm: - bed, chambering, * conceive.
Let us walk
honestly, as in the day; not in rioting and
drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in
strife and envying: Ro.13:13
And the voice of
harpers, and musicians, and of pipers, and
trumpeters, shall be heard no more at all in thee; and no
craftsman, of whatsoever craft he be, shall be found any
more in thee; and the sound of a millstone shall be heard
no more at all in thee; Rev 18:22
Mousikos (g3451) moo-sik-os'; from
Mousa , (a Muse); "musical", i.e. (as noun) a minstrel:
- musician
Now his elder son was in
the field: and as he came and drew nigh to the house, he heard musick and dancing. Lu.15:25
Sumphonia (g4858) soom-fo-nee'-ah;
from 4859; unison of sound ("symphony"), i.e. a concert
of instruments (harmonious note): - music.
Phoneo (g5455) fo-neh'-o; from
5456; to emit a sound (animal, human or instrumental); by impl. to address in
words or by name, also in imitation: - call (for), crow, cry.
and Leto is called by this name, because she is such
a gentle Goddess, and so willing (ethelemon) to grant our
requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often called
by strangers- they seem to imply by it her amiability, and
her smooth and easy-going way of behaving.
Artemis is named from her healthy
(artemes), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of
virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue
(arete), and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the
sexes (ton aroton miseasa). He who gave the Goddess her
name may have had any or all of these reasons.
Her. What
is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?
Soc. Son
of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious
and also a facetious explanation of both these names; the
serious explanation is not to be had from me, but there is
no objection to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods
too love a joke.
Dionusos
is simply didous oinon (giver
of wine), as he might be
called in fun,-
and oinos is properly oionous, because wine makes those who drink, think
(oiesthai) that they have a mind (nous) when they have none.
The derivation
of Aphrodite, born of the
foam (aphoros), may be fairly accepted on the authority of
Hesiod.
Her.
Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, will
surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.
Soc. I am
not likely to forget them.
Her. No,
indeed.
Soc.
There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation
of Athene.
Her. What
other appellation?
Soc. We
call her Pallas.
Her. To
be sure.
Soc. And
we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances.
For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth,
or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (pallein), or dancing.
Her. That
is quite true.
Soc. Then
that is the explanation of the name Pallas?
Her. Yes;
but what do you say of the other name?
Soc.
Athene?
Her. Yes.
Soc. That
is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern interpreters of
Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the view of the
ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the
poet, assert that he meant by Athene "mind" (nous) and "intelligence" (dianoia), and the maker of names appears to have had a
singular notion about her; and indeed calls her by a still
higher title, "divine
intelligence" (Thou noesis),
as though he would say:
This is she who has the mind of God
(Theonoa);- using a as a dialectical variety e, and taking
away i and s. Perhaps, however, the name Theonoe may
mean "she who knows divine
things" (Theia noousa)
better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing
that the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with
moral intelligence (en ethei noesin), and therefore gave her
the name ethonoe; which, however, either he or his successors
have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and
called her Athene.
Her. But
what do you say of Hephaestus?
Soc.
Speak you of the princely lord
of light (Phaeos istora)?
Her.
Surely.
Soc. Ephaistos is Phaistos, and has added the e by attraction; that is
obvious to anybody.
Her. That
is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into
your head.
Soc. To
prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of
Ares.
Her. What
is Ares?
Soc. Ares
may be called, if you will, from his manhood (arren) and
manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable
nature, which is the meaning of arratos: the latter is a
derivation in every way appropriate to the God of war.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And
now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am
afraid of them; ask about anything but them, and thou shalt
see how the steeds of Euthyphro can prance.
Her. Only one more
God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a true son. Let
us make him out, and then I shall know whether there is any
meaning in what Cratylus says.
Soc. I
should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the interpreter
(ermeneus), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do
with language; as I was telling you the word eirein is
expressive of the use of speech, and there is an
often-recurring Homeric word emesato, which means "he
contrived"-
out of these two words, eirein and mesasthai,
the legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and we may imagine him dictating to us the
use of this name: "O my friends," says he to us, "seeing
that he is the contriver of
tales or speeches,
you may rightly call him Eirhemes."
And this has been improved by us, as we think, into
Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the
verb "to tell" (eirein), because she was a messenger.
Her. Then
I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that
I was no true son of Hermes (Ermogenes), for I am not a good hand at speeches.
Soc.
There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son of Hermes. [A
Second Incarnation]
Her. How
do you make that out?
Soc. You
are aware that speech signifies all things (pan), and is
always turning them round and round, and has two forms, true
and false?
Her. Certainly.
Soc. Is
not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which
dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy;
for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life, and tragedy is the place of them?
Tragedy Goat Songs
Her. Very
true.
Soc. Then
surely Pan, who is the declarer of all things (pan) and the
perpetual mover (aei polon) of all things,
is rightly called aipolos
(goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes,
smooth in his upper part, and
rough and goatlike in his lower regions.
And, as the son of Hermes,
he is speech or the brother of speech, and that brother
should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying,
my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.
Her. From
these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should
we not discuss another kind of Gods- the sun, moon, stars,
earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?
Soc. You
impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I
will not refuse.
Her. You
will oblige me.
Soc. How
would you have me begin? Shall I take first of all him whom
you mentioned first- the sun?
Her. Very
good.
Soc. The
origin of the sun will probably be clearer in the Doric form,
for the Dorians call him alios, and this name is given to him because when he
rises he gathers (alizoi) men
together or because he is always rolling
in his course (aei eilein ion) about the earth; or from aiolein, of
which meaning is the same as poikillein (to variegate), because he variegates the
productions of the earth.
Her. But
what is selene (the moon)?
Soc. That
name is rather unfortunate for Anaxagoras.
Her. How
so?
Soc. The
word seems to forestall his recent
discovery, that the moon receives her light from the
sun.
Her. Why
do you say so?
Soc. The
two words selas (brightness) and phos (light) have much the same meaning?
Her. Yes.
Soc. This
light about the moon is always new (neon) and
always old (enon), if the disciples of Anaxagoras say truly.
For the sun in his revolution always adds new light, and
there is the old light of the previous month.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. The
moon is not unfrequently called selanaia.
Her.
True.
Soc. And
as she has a light which is always old and always new (enon neon aei)
she may very properly have the name selaenoneoaeia; and this
when hammered into shape becomes selanaia.
Her. A
real dithyrambic sort of name that, Socrates. But what do you
say of the month and the stars?
Soc. Meis (month) is
called from meiousthai (to lessen), because suffering diminution; the
name of astra (stars) seems to be derived from astrape, which
is an improvement on anastphope, signifying the upsetting of the eyes
(anastrephein opa).
Her. What
do you say of pur (fire) and
udor (water)?
Soc. I am
at a loss how to explain pur; either the muse of Euthyphro
has deserted me, or there is some very great difficulty in
the word. Please, however, to note the contrivance which I
adopt whenever I am in a difficulty of this sort.
Her. What
is it?
Soc. I
will tell you; but I should like to know first whether you
can tell me what is the meaning of the pur?
Her.
Indeed I cannot.
Soc.
Shall I tell you what I suspect to be the true explanation
of this and several other words?-
My belief is that they are of
foreign origin.
For the Hellenes, especially those who were under the
dominion of the barbarians, often borrowed from them.
Her. What
is the inference?
Soc. Why,
you know that any one who seeks to demonstrate the fitness
of these names according to the Hellenic language, and not
according to the language from which the words are derived,
is rather likely to be at fault.
Her. Yes,
certainly.
Soc. Well
then, consider whether this pur is not foreign; for the word
is not easily brought into relation with the Hellenic
tongue, and the Phrygians may be observed to have the same
word slightly changed, just as they have udor (water) and
kunes (dogs), and many other words.
Her. That
is true.
Soc. Any violent interpretations of the words should be
avoided; for something to say about them may easily
be found. And thus I get rid of pur and udor. Aer (air), Hermogenes,
may be explained as the
element which
raises (airei) things from the earth, or as ever flowing (aei pei), or because the flux of the air is wind, and the poets call the
winds "air-blasts," (aetai);
he who uses the term may
mean, so to speak, air-flux (aetorroun), in the sense of wind-flux (pneumatorroun); and because this moving wind may be expressed by either
term he employs the word air (aer = aetes rheo).
Aither (aether) I should interpret as
aeitheer; this may be correctly said,
because this element is always running in a flux about the
air (aei thei peri tou aera ron). The
meaning of the word ge (earth) comes out better when in the form of gaia, for the earth may be truly
called "mother" (gaia, genneteira), as in the
language of Homer (Od. ix. 118; xiii. 160) gegaasi means
gegennesthai.
Her.
Good.
Soc. What
shall we take next? Her. There are orai (the seasons), and
the two names of the year, eniautos and etos.
Soc. The
orai
should be spelt in the old
Attic way, if you desire to
know the probable truth about them; they are rightly called
the orai because they divide (orizousin) the summers
and winters and winds and the fruits of the earth. The words
eniautos and etos appear to be the same,- "that which
brings to light the plants and growths of the earth in their
turn, and passes them in review within itself (en eauto
exetazei)": this is broken up into two words, eniautos from
en eauto, and etos from etazei, just as the original name of
Zeus was divided into Zena and Dia; and the whole
proposition means that his power of reviewing from within is
one, but has two names, two words etos and eniautos being
thus formed out of a single proposition.
Her.
Indeed, Socrates, you make surprising progress.
Soc. I am
run away with.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. But
am not yet at my utmost speed.
Her. I
should like very much to know, in the next place, how you
would explain the virtues. What principle of correctness is there in
those charming words- wisdom, understanding, justice, and the rest of them?
Soc. That
is a tremendous class of names which you are disinterring;
still, as I have put on the lion's skin, I must not be faint
of heart;
and I suppose that I must consider the
meaning of wisdom (phronesis) and understanding (sunesis), and judgment (gnome), and knowledge (episteme), and all those other charming words, as you
call them?
Her. Surely, we must not leave off until we
find out their meaning.
Soc. By
the dog of Egypt I have not a bad notion which came into my
head only this moment: I believe that the primeval givers of
names were undoubtedly like
too many of our modern philosophers,
who, in their search after the
nature of things,
are always getting dizzy from
constantly going round and round,
and then they imagine that the world is going round and round and
moving in all directions;
and this appearance, which arises out of their own internal
condition, they suppose to be a reality of nature; they think
that there is nothing stable
or permanent, but only flux and motion, and
that the world is always full of every sort of motion and
change. The consideration of the names which I mentioned has
led me into making this reflection.
Her. How
is that, Socrates?
Soc.
Perhaps you did not observe that in the names which have
been just cited, the motion or flux or generation of things
is most surely indicated.
Her. No,
indeed, I never thought of it.
Soc. Take
the first of those which you mentioned; clearly that is a
name indicative of motion.
Her. What
was the name? Soc. Phronesis (wisdom), which may signify Phoras kai rhou
noesis (perception of motion and flux), or perhaps Phoras onesis
(the blessing of motion), but is at any rate connected with
Pheresthai (motion); gnome (judgment), again, certainly implies the
ponderation or consideration (nomesis) of generation, for to
ponder is the same as to consider; or, if you would rather,
here is noesis, the very word just now mentioned, which is
neou esis (the desire of the
new);
the word neos implies that the world is always in process of creation. The giver of the name wanted to express his
longing of the soul, for the original name was neoesis, and not
noesis.
The word sophrosune is the salvation (soteria) of that wisdom
(phronesis) which we were just now considering.
Epioteme
(knowledge) is akin to this, and indicates that the soul
which is good for anything follows (epetai) the motion of things, neither anticipating them nor falling
behind them; wherefor the word should rather be read as
epistemene, inserting en.
Sunesis
(understanding) may be regarded in like manner as a kind of
conclusion; the word is derived from sunienai (to go
along with), and, like epistasthai (to know), implies the progression of the soul in
company with the nature of things.
1 Peter 3:21
Sophia
(wisdom) is very dark, and appears not to be of native growth;
the meaning is, touching the
motion or stream of things.
You must remember that the poets, when
they speak of the commencement of any rapid motion,
often use the word esuthe (he rushed); and there was a famous Lacedaemonian
who was named Sous (Rush), for by this word the Lacedaemonians
signify rapid motion,
and the touching (epaphe) of
motion is expressed by
sophia, for all things are
supposed to be in motion.
Good (agathon) is
the name which is given to the admirable
(agasto) in nature; for, although all things move, still
there are degrees of motion; some are swifter, some
slower; but there are some things which are admirable for
their swiftness, and this admirable part of nature is
called agathon. Dikaiosune (justice)
is clearly dikaiou sunesis
(understanding of the just);
but the actual word dikaion is more difficult: men are
only agreed to a certain extent about justice, and then
they begin to disagree.
For those who suppose all things to be in
motion conceive the greater part of nature to be a mere
receptacle; and they say that there is a penetrating power
which passes through all this, and is the instrument of
creation in all, and is the subtlest and swiftest element;
for if it were not the subtlest, and a power which none can
keep out, and also the swiftest, passing by other things as
if they were standing still, it could not penetrate through
the moving universe. And this element, which superintends
all things and pieces (diaion) all, is rightly called
dikaion; the letter k is only added for the sake of euphony.
Thus far, as I was saying, there is a general agreement
about the nature of justice; but I, Hermogenes, being an
enthusiastic disciple, have been told in a mystery that the
justice of which I am speaking is also the cause of the
world: now a cause is that because of which anything is
created; and some one comes and whispers in my ear that
justice is rightly so called because partaking of the nature
of the cause, and I begin, after hearing what he has said,
to interrogate him gently: "Well, my excellent friend," say
I, "but if all this be true, I still want to know what is
justice." Thereupon they think that I ask tiresome
questions, and am leaping over the barriers, and have been
already sufficiently answered, and they try to satisfy me
with one derivation after another, and at length they
quarrel.
For one of them says that justice is the sun, and that he only is the piercing
(diaionta) and burning (kaonta) element which is the guardian of
nature. And when I joyfully repeat this beautiful notion, I
am answered by the satirical remark, "What, is there no
justice in the world when the sun is down?" And when I
earnestly beg my questioner to tell me his own honest
opinion, he says, "Fire in the abstract"; but this is not
very intelligible. Another says, "No, not fire in the
abstract, but the abstraction of heat in the fire." Another
man professes to laugh at all this, and says, as Anaxagoras
says, that justice is mind, for mind, as they say, has absolute power,
and mixes with nothing, and orders all things, and passes
through all things. At last, my friend, I find myself in far
greater perplexity about the nature of justice than I was
before I began to learn. But still I am of opinion that the
name, which has led me into this digression, was given to
justice for the reasons which I have mentioned.
Her. I
think, Socrates, that you are not improvising
now; you must have heard this from some one else.
Soc. And
not the rest?
Her.
Hardly. Soc. Well, then, let me go on in the hope of making
you believe in the originality of the rest. What remains
after justice? I do not think that we have as yet discussed
courage (andreia),- injustice (adikia), which is obviously
nothing more than a hindrance to the penetrating principle
(diaiontos), need not be considered. Well, then, the name of
andreia seems to imply a battle;- this battle is in the
world of existence, and according to the doctrine of flux is only
the counterflux (enantia rhon): if you extract the d from
andreia, the name at once signifies the thing, and you may
clearly understand that andreia is not the stream opposed to
every stream, but only to that which is contrary to justice,
for otherwise courage would not have been praised.
The words arren (male) and aner (man) also contain a similar allusion to the
same principle of the upward flux (te ano rhon).
Gune (woman) I
suspect to be the same word as goun (birth):
thelu (female) appears to be partly derived from thele (the teat),
because the teat is like rain, and makes things flourish
(tethelenai).
Her. That
is surely probable.
Soc. Yes;
and the very word thallein (to flourish) seems to figure the growth of
youth, which is swift and sudden ever. And this is expressed
by the legislator in the name, which is a compound of thein
(running), and allesthai (leaping). Pray observe how I gallop away when
I get on smooth ground. There are a good many names
generally thought to be of importance, which have still to
be explained.
Her.
True.
Soc.
There is the meaning of the word techne (art), for
example.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. That
may be identified with echonoe, and expresses the possession of mind: you have
only to take away the t and insert two o's, one between the
ch and n, and another between the n and e.
Her. That
is a very shabby etymology.
Soc. Yes, my dear friend; but then
you know that the original names have been long ago buried and disguised by people sticking
on and stripping off letters for the sake of euphony, and twisting and bedizening
them in all sorts of ways: and time too may have had a share
in the change. Take, for example, the word katoptron; why is the letter r inserted?
This must surely be the
addition of some one who cares nothing about the truth,
but thinks
only of putting the mouth into shape. And the additions are often
such that at last no human being can possibly make out the
original meaning of the word.
Another example is the
word sphigx, sphiggos, which ought properly to be
phigx, phiggos, and there are other
examples.
Her. That
is quite true, Socrates.
Soc. And
yet, if you are permitted to put in and pull out any letters
which you please, names will be too easily made, and any
name may be adapted to any object.
Her.
True.
Soc. Yes,
that is true. And therefore a wise dictator, like yourself,
should observe the laws of moderation and probability.
Her. Such
is my desire.
Soc. And
mine, too, Hermogenes. But do not be too much of a
precisian, or "you will unnerve me of my strength." When you
have allowed me to add mechane (contrivance) to techne (art) I shall be at the top of my bent, for I
conceive mechane to be a sign of great accomplishment- anein;
for mekos the meaning of greatness, and these two, mekos and anein, make up the word mechane.
Wherefore if Demetrius,
and the craftsmen which are with him, have a matter
against any man, the law is open, and there are deputies:
let them implead one another. Ac.19:38
And the voice of
harpers, and musicians, and of pipers, and trumpeters,
shall be heard no more at all in thee; and no craftsman,
of whatsoever craft he be, shall be found any more in
thee; and the sound of a millstone shall be heard no more
at all in thee; Re.18:22
Technites (h5079) tekh-nee'-tace; from
5078; an artisan; fig. a founder (Creator): - builder,
craftsman.
But, as I was saying, being now at the top
of my bent, I should like to consider the meaning of the two
words arete (virtue) and kakia (vice) arete I do not as yet understand, but
kakia is transparent, and agrees with the principles which
preceded, for all things being in a flux (ionton), kakia is
kakos ion (going badly); and this evil motion when
existing in the soul has the general name of kakia or vice,
specially appropriated to it. The meaning of kakos ienai may
be further illustrated by the use of deilia
(cowardice), which ought to have come after andreia, but
was forgotten, and, as I fear, is not the only word which
has been passed over. Deilia signifies that the soul is
bound with a strong chain (desmos), for lian means strength, and therefore
deilia expresses the greatest and strongest bond of the
soul; and aporia (difficulty) is an evil of the same nature
(from a not, and poreuesthai to go), like anything else which is an
impediment to motion and movement. Then the word kakia
appears to mean kakos ienai, or going badly, or limping and
halting; of which the consequence is, that the soul becomes
filled with vice. And if kakia is the name of this sort of
thing, arete will be the opposite of it, signifying in the
first place ease of motion, then that the stream of the good
soul is unimpeded, and has therefore the attribute of ever
flowing without let or hindrance, and is therefore called arete, or, more
correctly, aeireite (ever-flowing), and may perhaps have had
another form, airete (eligible), indicating that nothing is more
eligible than virtue, and this has been hammered into arete.
I daresay that you will deem this to be another invention of
mine, but I think that if the previous word kakia was right,
then arete is also right.
Her. But
what is the meaning of kakon, which has played so great a
part in your previous discourse?
Soc. That
is a very singular word about which I can hardly form an
opinion, and therefore I must have recourse to my ingenious
device.
Her. What
device?
Soc. The
device of a foreign origin, which I shall give to this word
also.
Her. Very
likely you are right; but suppose that we leave these words
and endeavour to see the rationale of kalon and aischron.
Soc. The
meaning of aischron is evident, being only aei ischon roes
(always preventing from flowing), and this is in accordance
with our former derivations. For the name-giver was a great
enemy to stagnation of all sorts, and hence he gave the name
aeischoroun to that which hindered the flux (aei ischon
roun), and that is now beaten together into aischron.
Her. But
what do you say of kalon?
Soc. That
is more obscure; yet the form is only due to the quantity,
and has been changed by altering ou into o.
Her. What
do you mean?
Soc. This
name appears to denote mind.
Her. How
so?
Soc. Let
me ask you what is the cause why anything has a name; is not
the principle which imposes the name the cause?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. And
must not this be the mind of
Gods, or of men, or of both?
Her. Yes.
Soc. Is
not mind that which called (kalesan) things
by their names, and is not mind the beautiful (kalon)?
Her. That
is evident.
Soc. And
are not the works of intelligence and mind worthy of praise,
and are not other works worthy of blame?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. Physic does the
work of a physician, and carpentering does the works of a
carpenter?
Her.
Exactly.
Soc. And
the principle of beauty does the works of beauty?
Her. Of
course.
Soc. And
that principle we affirm to be mind?
Her. Very
true.
Soc. Then
mind is rightly called beauty because she does the works
which we recognize and speak of as the beautiful?
Her. That
is evident.
Soc. What
more names remain to us?
Her.
There are the words which are connected with agathon and
kalon, such as sumpheron and lusiteloun, ophelimon, kerdaleon, and
their opposites.
Soc. The
meaning of sumpheron (expedient) I think that you may discover for
yourself by the light of the previous examples,- for it is a
sister word to episteme, meaning just the motion (pora)
of the soul accompanying the
world, and things which are
done upon this principle are called sumphora or sumpheronta, because they are carried round with the world.
Her. That
is probable.
Soc.
Again, cherdaleon (gainful) is called from cherdos (gain),
but you must alter the d into n if you want to get at the
meaning; for this word also signifies good, but in another
way; he who gave the name intended to express the power of
admixture (kerannumenon) and universal penetration in the
good; in forming the word, however, he inserted a d instead
of an n, and so made kerdos.
Her.
Well, but what is lusiteloun (profitable)?
Soc. I
suppose, Hermogenes, that people do not mean by the
profitable the gainful or that which pays (luei) the
retailer, but they use the word in the sense of swift.
You regard the profitable (lusitelou), as
that which being the swiftest thing in existence,
allows of no stay in things and no pause or end of motion, but always, if there begins to be any end,
lets things go again (luei), and
makes motion immortal and
unceasing: and in this point
of view, as appears to me, the good is happily denominated lusiteloun-
being that which looses (luon) the end (telos) of motion. Ophelimon (the advantageous) is derived from ophellein,
meaning that which creates and increases; this latter is a
common Homeric word, and has a foreign character.
Her. And
what do you say of their opposites?
Soc. Of
such as mere negatives I hardly think that I need speak.
Her.
Which are they?
Soc. The
words axumphoron (inexpedient), anopheles (unprofitable),
alusiteles (unadvantageous), akerdes (ungainful).
Her.
True.
Soc. I
would rather take the words blaberon (harmful), zemiodes
(hurtful).
Her.
Good.
Soc. The
word blaberon is that which is said to hinder or harm
(blaptein) the stream (roun); blapton is boulomenon aptein (seeking
to hold or bind); for aptein is the same as dein, and dein
is always a term of censure; boulomenon aptein roun (wanting to bind the
stream) would properly be boulapteroun, and this, as I imagine, is improved into
blaberon.
Her. You
bring out curious results, Socrates, in the use of names;
and when I hear the word boulapteroun I cannot help imagining that you are making your mouth into a
flute, and puffing away at
some prelude to Athene.
Soc. That
is the fault of the makers of the name, Hermogenes; not
mine.
Her. Very
true; but what is the derivation of zemiodes?
Soc. What
is the meaning of zemiodes?- let me remark, Hermogenes, how right I was
in saying that great changes are made in the meaning of
words by putting in and pulling out letters; even a very
slight permutation will sometimes give an entirely opposite
sense; I may instance the word deon, which occurs to me at the moment, and reminds
me of what I was going to say to you, that the fine
fashionable language of modern times has twisted and
disguised and entirely altered the original meaning both of
deon,
and also of zemiodes, which in the old language is clearly
indicated.
Her. What
do you mean?
Soc. I
will try to explain. You are aware that our forefathers
loved the sounds i and d, especially the women, who are most
conservative of the ancient language, but now they change i
into e (long) or e (short), and d into z; this is supposed
to increase the grandeur of the sound.
Her. How
do you mean?
Soc. For
example, in very ancient times they called the day either
imera or emera (short e), which is called by us emera (long
e).
Her. That
is true.
Soc. Do
you observe that only the ancient form shows the intention
of the giver of the name? of which the reason is, that men
long for (imeirousi) and love the light which comes after
the darkness, and is therefore called imera, from imeros,
desire.
Her.
Clearly.
Soc. But
now the name is so travestied that you cannot tell the
meaning, although there are some who imagine the day to be
called emuera because it makes things gentle (emera).
Her. Such
is my view.
Soc. And
do you know that the ancients said dougon and not zugon?
Her. They
did so.
Soc. And
zugon (yoke) has no meaning,- it ought to be duogon, which
word expresses the binding of
two together (duein agoge)
for the purpose of drawing;- this has been changed into
zugon, and there are many other examples of similar changes.
Her.
There are.
Soc.
Proceeding in the same train of thought I may remark that
the word deon (obligation) has a meaning which is the
opposite of all the other appellations of good; for deon is
here a species of good, and is, nevertheless, the chain (desmos)
or hinderer of motion, and therefore own brother of
blaberon.
Her. Yes,
Socrates; that is quite plain.
Soc. Not
if you restore the ancient form, which is more likely to be
the correct one, and read dion instead of deon; if you
convert the e into an i after the old fashion, this word
will then agree with other words meaning good; for dion, not
deon, signifies the good, and is a term of praise; and the
author of names has not contradicted himself, but in all
these various appellations, deon (obligatory), ophelimon (advantageous), lusiteloun (profitable), kerdaleon (gainful), agathon (good), sumpheron (expedient), euporon (plenteous), the same conception is implied of
the ordering or all-pervading principle which is praised,
and the restraining and binding principle which is censured.
And this is further illustrated by the word zemiodes
(hurtful), which if the z is only changed into d as in the
ancient language, becomes demiodes; and this name, as you
will perceive, is given to that which binds motion (dounti
ion).
Her. What do you say of edone
(pleasure), lupe (pain), epithumia (desire), and the like, Socrates?
Hedone.
The leader of the
vulgar, charismatic religion as a "spiritual" army:
-dêmagôgeô , to be a leader of the
people, kalôs d. Isoc.2.16 ; têi men exousiai turannôn, tais d' euergesiais
dêmagôgôn Id.10.37 ; cf. dêmagôgei: stratêgei, Hsch.: usu.
in bad sense, Ar.Ra.423, etc.
-turanneuô: to be a turannos, an absolute sovereign or
despot,
and in aor. to become such, Hdt., etc.: to be a prince
or princess, Eur.
The dêmagôgeô
continued: 2. c. acc. pers., d. andras curry favour with, X.An.7.6.4 , cf. Arist.Pol.
1305b26, al.:--Pass., to be won over, conciliated by popular arts, J.AJ 16.2.5.
-Xenophon, Anabasis
X.An.7.6.4 [4] When
the Lacedaemonians asked what sort of a man Xenophon
was, he replied that he was not a bad fellow on the
whole, but he was a friend of the soldiers, and on that
account things went the worse for him. And they said:
"He plays the demagogue, you mean, with the men?"
"Exactly that," said Heracleides. [5] "Well," said they,
"he won't go so far, will he, as to oppose us in the
matter of taking away the army?" "Why," said
Heracleides, "if you gather the men together and promise
them their pay, they will hurry after you, paying scant
heed to him."
b. = psuchagôgeô, ton
pothon, of a
work of art,
Him.Ecl.31.6; to theatron, of Homer, Id.Or.20.3.
He uses spectacle
of sight, sound and emotion to dominate: theater.
-Theatron [theaomai]
1. a place for seeing,
esp. a theatre, Hdt., Thuc., etc.
2. collective for hoi theatai, the people in the theatre, the spectators, "the house, " Hdt., Ar.
3. = theama, a show, spectacle, th. genêthênai,
theatrizesthai, NTest.
-Theama [theaomai] that which is
seen, a sight, show, spectacle, Trag., Thuc., etc.
Kosmo-phthoros , on, destroying the
world, AP11.270.
-Theatrizô 1 2 [theatron] to bring
on the stage:-- Pass. to be made a show of, a gazing-stock, NTest.
Similar to
theatrizo:
Mossunikos , ê, on, made by the
Mossunoikoi, mazonomeia Ar.Fr. 417
These are the MUSES
or musicians of Revelation 18:22. They serve Apollo or
Abbadon or Apollyon. They are known throughout the
literature as the LOCUSTS-musical performers. The
Cynics known as "dogs" were intimately involved as
sorcerers:
-Kunaô , = kunizô, play the Cynic, Luc.Demon. 21. [homosexuals]
-Kumbalizô , play the cymbals,
Men.326, LXX Ne.12.27, Arr.Ind. 7.8, Chor.in
Rev.Phil.1.10.
And at the
dedication of the wall of Jerusalem they sought the
Levites out of all their places, to bring them to
Jerusalem, to keep the dedication with gladness, both with
thanksgivings, and with singing, with cymbals,
psalteries, and with harps. Neh 12:27
Meceleth (h4700) mets-ay'-leth;
from 6749; (only dual) double tinklers, i. e. cymbals:
- cymbals.
Other related
words are:
-Drakizô , play the buffoon,
Gloss.
-Parasi-tor . a-ri, v. dep. [id.] ,
to play the parasite, to sponge: parasitarier, Plaut.
Stich. 4, 2, 54: parasitando pascere ventres suos, id.
Pers. 1, 2, 3 .
-sophis-tēs , ou, o(, A. master
of one's craft, adept, expert, of diviners, Hdt.2.49;
of poets, “meletan sophistais prosbalon” Pi.I.5(4).28,
cf. Cratin.2; of
musicians, “sophistēs . . parapaiōn khelun”
3. c. acc. rei, introduce measures so as to
win popularity, ta pros hêdonên tôi plêthei D.H.Dem. 17 ; boulas d. LXX1
Es.5.70(73) .
II. in causal sense, d.
tina make him popular, App.BC5.53, Pun.133.
Soc. I do
not think, Hermogenes, that there is any great difficulty
about them- edone is e onesis, the action which tends to advantage; and the
original form may be supposed to have been eone, but this
has been altered by the insertion of the d. Lupe appears to
be derived from the relaxation (luein) which the body feels when in sorrow; ania (trouble)
is the hindrance of motion (a and ienai); algedon
(distress), if I am not mistaken, is a foreign word, which
is derived from aleinos (grievous); odune (grief) is called from the putting on (endusis)
sorrow; in achthedon (vexation) "the word too labours,"
as any one may see; chara
(joy) is the very expression of the fluency and diffusion of the soul (cheo);
chara , hê: ( [chairô] ):--joy, delight, Voluptous
-terpsis (delight) is so called from the pleasure
creeping (erpon) through the soul, which may be likened to a
breath (pnoe) and is properly erpnoun, but
has been altered by time into terpnon; eupherosune (cheerfulness)
and epithumia explain themselves; the former, which ought
to be eupherosune and has been changed euphrosune,
is named, as every one may see,
from the soul
moving (pheresthai) in harmony with
nature;
epithumia is really e epi ton thumon iousa dunamis,
the power which enters into the soul; thumos
(passion) is called from the rushing (thuseos)
and boiling of the soul; imeros (desire) denotes the stream (rous)
which most draws the soul dia
ten esin tes roes-
because flowing with desire (iemenos),
and expresses a longing after things and violent
attraction of the soul to them, and is termed imeros
from possessing this power;
pothos (longing) is expressive of the desire of
that which is not present but absent, and in another
place (pou); this is the reason why the name pothos is
applied to things absent, as imeros is
to things present; eros (love) is so called because flowing in
(esron) from without;
the stream
is
not inherent, but is
an influence introduced
through the eyes, and
from flowing in was called esros
(influx) in the old time when they used o (short) for
o (long), and is called eros, now that o (long) is substituted for o
(short). But why do you not give me another word?
Her. What do you think of doxa (opinion), and that class of
words?
Soc. Doxa is either derived from dioxis (pursuit), and expresses the march of the soul in the pursuit of knowledge,
or from the shooting of a bow (toxon); the latter is more
likely, and is confirmed by oiesis (thinking), which is only oisis (moving), and implies the
movement of the soul to the essential nature of each
thing-
just as boule (counsel) has to do with shooting (bole);
and boulesthai (to wish) combines the notion of aiming and deliberating- all these words seem to
follow doxa, and all involve the idea of shooting,
just as aboulia, absence of counsel, on
the other hand, is a mishap, or missing, or mistaking of the mark, or
aim, or proposal, or object.
-Diôkô, 1. pursue, chase, in war
or hunting, of a lover, II. drive or chase away,
b. c. acc. pers., of a lover, Sapph. l. c.; follow,
X.HG1.1.13; tous eugnômonas Id.Mem.2.8.6 ; d. kai
philein tina Pl.Tht.168a , cf. Ev.Luc.17.23
I.2 describe, -humnôi aretas
III.3. urge
impel, “belos kheri” Pi.I.8(7).35;
; phorminga plaktrôi Id.N.5.24; esp.
of music, d. mousan Pratin.Lyr.5; d. melos
Simon. 29 :--Pass., huph' hêdonês diôkomai . . sun
tachei molein S.El.871
-Belos, eos, to, missile, esp.
arrow, dart. 2. used of any weapon, as a sword, the
sting of a scorpion, 3. agana belea of
Apollo, Il.24.759, Od.3.280, and of Artemis, ib.5.124,
denote
sudden, easy death of men and women respectively.
4.b. the shaft of love
-Phorm-igx ,
iggos, h(,
A. lyre,
freq. in
Hom., esp. as
the instrument of Apollo, “
phormiggos perikalleos hēn ekh' Apollōn”
Il.1.603,
cf.
24.63,
Od.17.270,
Hes.Sc.203;
of Achilles, “
phrena terpomenon phormiggi ligeiē kalē daidaleē”
Il.9.186;
with seven strings (after Terpander's time),
heptaktupos, heptaglōssos, Pi.P.2.71,
N.5.24;
“
antipsallōn elephantodeton ph.”
Ar.Av.219
(anap.).
2. ph. akhordos, metaph. for a
bow, Arist.
Rh.1413a1.
-Pindar Nemean 5 Reverence
restrains me from speaking of an enormous and unjust
venture, [15] how indeed they left the glorious island,
and what divine power drove the brave men from Oenone. I
will stop: it is not always beneficial for the
precise truth to show her face, and silence is often
the wisest thing for a man to heed. [19] But if it is
resolved to praise wealth, or the strength of hands, or
iron war, [20] let
someone mark off a long jump for me from this point. I
have a light spring in my knees, and eagles swoop over
the sea. The most beautiful chorus of Muses
sang gladly for the Aeacids on Mt. Pelion, and among
them Apollo, sweeping the seven-tongued lyre with a
golden plectrum, [25] led all types of strains. And the
Muses began with a prelude to Zeus, then sang first of
divine Thetis and of Peleus
-Melos 2.music
to which a song is set, tune, 3.melody
of an instrument, phorminxd'auphthengoith'hieron m. êdekaiaulos
-Mousa the nine muses. Used of
Dionysus, of Melodia, of Cantus, of aeidô, of aoidaô, of humneô, of Apollon,
Her. You
are quickening your pace now, Socrates.
Soc. Why
yes, the end I now dedicate to God, not, however, until I
have explained anagke (necessity), which ought to come next, and ekousion (the
voluntary). Ekousion is certainly the yielding (eikon) and
unresisting- the notion implied is yielding and not
opposing, yielding, as I was just now saying, to that motion
which is in accordance with our will; but the necessary and
resistant being contrary to our will, implies error and ignorance; the
idea is taken from walking through a ravine which is
impassable, and rugged, and overgrown, and impedes motion-
and this is the derivation of the word anagkaion
(necessary) an agke ion, going through a ravine. But while my strength
lasts let us persevere, and I hope that you will persevere
with your questions.
Her.
Well, then, let me ask about the greatest and noblest, such
as aletheia (truth) and pseudos (falsehood) and on (being), not forgetting to
enquire why the word onoma (name), which is the theme of our discussion,
has this name of onoma.
Soc. You
know the word maiesthai (to seek)?
Her.
Yes;- meaning the same as zetein
(to enquire).
Soc. The
word onoma seems to be a compressed sentence, signifying
on ou zetema (being for which there
is a search); as is still
more obvious in onomaston (notable),
which states in so many words
that real existence is that for which there is a seeking (on ou
masma);
aletheia
is also an agglomeration of theia ale (divine
wandering),
implying the divine motion of existence;
Aletheia (g225) al-ay'-thi-a; from
227; truth: - true, * truly, truth, verity.
Aletheuo (g226) al-ayth-yoo'-o; from
227; to be true (in doctrine and profession): - speak
(tell) the truth.
Aletheis
(g227) al-ay-thace'; from 1 (as a neg. particle) and 2990;
true (as not concealing): - true, truly, truth.
Lanthano (g2990) lan-than'-o; a
prol. form of a prim. verb, which is used only as an
alt. in certain tenses; to lie hid (lit. or fig.); often
used adv. unwittingly: - be hid, be ignorant of,
unawares.
But the hour cometh, and
now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father
in spirit (Mind) and in truth: for the
Father seeketh such to worship him. Jn.4:23
God is a Spirit: and
they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in
truth. Jn.4:24
The woman saith unto
him, I know that Messias cometh, which is called Christ:
when he is come, he will tell us all things. John 4:25
Jesus saith unto
her, I that speak unto thee am he. John 4:26
pseudos
(falsehood) is the opposite of motion; here is another ill
name given by the legislator to stagnation and forced
inaction, which he compares to sleep
(eudein); but the original meaning of the word is
disguised by the addition of ps; on and ousia are ion with
an i broken off; this agrees with the true principle, for
being (on) is also moving (ion), and the same may be said of not
being, which is likewise called not going (oukion or ouki
on = ouk ion).
Her. You
have hammered away at them manfully; but suppose that some
one were to say to you, what is the word ion, and what are
reon and doun?- show me their fitness.
Soc. You
mean to say, how should I answer him?
Her. Yes.
Soc. One
way of giving the appearance of an answer has been already
suggested.
Her. What
way?
Soc. To say that names which we do
not understand are of foreign origin; and this is very
likely the right answer, and something of this kind may be
true of them; but also the original forms of words may have
been lost in the lapse of ages;
names have been so
twisted in all manner of ways, that I should not be
surprised if the old language when compared with that now
in use would appear to us to be a barbarous tongue.
Her. Very
likely.
Soc. Yes,
very likely. But still the enquiry demands our earnest
attention and we must not flinch. For we should remember,
that if a person go on analysing names into words, and
enquiring also into the elements out of which the words are
formed, and keeps on always repeating this process, he who
has to answer him must at last give up the enquiry in
despair.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And
at what point ought he to lose heart and give up the
enquiry? Must he not stop when he comes to the names which
are the elements of all other names and sentences; for these
cannot be supposed to be made up of other names? The word agathon (good),
for example, is, as we were saying, a compound of agastos
(admirable) and thoos (swift). And probably those is made up of
other elements, and these again of others. But if we take a
word which is incapable of further resolution, then we shall
be right in saying that we have at last reached a primary
element, which need not be resolved any further.
Her. I
believe you to be in the right.
Soc. And
suppose the names about which you are now asking should turn
out to be primary elements, must not their truth or law be
examined according to some new method?
Her. Very
likely.
Soc.
Quite so, Hermogenes; all that has preceded would lead to
this conclusion. And if, as I think, the conclusion is true,
then I shall again say to you, come and help me, that I may
not fall into some absurdity in stating the principle of
primary names.
Her. Let
me hear, and I will do my best to assist you.
Soc. I
think that you will acknowledge with me, that one principle
is applicable to all names, primary as well as secondary-
when they are regarded simply as names, there is no
difference in them.
Her.
Certainly not.
Soc. All
the names that we have been explaining were intended to
indicate the nature of things.
Her. Of
course.
Soc. And
that this is true of the primary quite as much as of the
secondary names, is implied in their being names.
Her.
Surely.
Soc. But
the secondary, as I conceive, derive their significance from
the primary.
Her. That
is evident.
Soc. Very
good; but then how do the primary names which precede
analysis show the natures of things, as far as they can be
shown; which they must do, if they are to be real names? And
here I will ask you a question:
Suppose that we had no voice or tongue, and wanted to communicate with one another,
should we not, like the deaf and dumb, make signs with the hands and head and the
rest of the body?
Her.
There would be no choice, Socrates.
Soc. We
should imitate the nature of the thing;
the elevation of our hands to heaven would mean lightness and upwardness;
heaviness and downwardness would be expressed by letting them drop to the ground;
if we were describing the running of a horse, or any other
animal,
we should make our bodies and their gestures as like as we
could to them.
Her. I do
not see that we could do anything else.
Soc. We
could not; for by bodily
imitation only can the body
ever express anything.
Her. Very
true.
Soc. And
when we want to express ourselves, either with the voice, or
tongue, or mouth,
the expression is simply their imitation of
that which we want to express.
Her. It
must be so, I think.
Soc. Then
a name is a vocal imitation of that which the vocal imitator
names or imitates?
Her. I
think so.
Soc. Nay,
my friend, I am disposed to think that we have not reached
the truth as yet.
Her. Why
not?
Soc.
Because if we have we shall be obliged to admit that the people who imitate sheep, or cocks, or other animals,
name that which they imitate.
Her.
Quite true.
Soc. Then could I have been right in what I was
saying?
Her. In
my opinion, no. But I wish that you would tell me, Socrates,
what sort of an imitation is a
name?
Soc. In
the first place, I should reply, not a musical imitation,
although that is also vocal;
nor, again,
an imitation of what music imitates;
these, in my judgment, would not be naming. Let me put the
matter as follows:
All objects have sound and figure, and many have colour?
Her.
Certainly.
Soc. But
the art of naming appears not to be concerned with imitations of
this kind;
the arts which have to do with them are music and drawing?
Her. True.
Soc.
Again, is there not an essence of each thing, just as there
is a colour, or sound? And is there not an essence of colour
and sound as well as of anything else which may be said to
have an essence?
Her. I
should think so.
Soc.
Well, and if any one could express the essence of each thing
in letters and syllables,
would he not express the nature of each
thing?
Her.
Quite so.
Soc. The
musician and the painter were the two names which you
gave to the two other imitators. What will this imitator be called?
Her. I
imagine, Socrates, that he must be the namer, or name-giver, of
whom we are in search.
Soc. If
this is true, then I think that we are in a condition to
consider the names ron (stream), ienai (to go), schesis
(retention), about which you were asking; and we may see
whether the namer has grasped the nature of them in letters
and syllables in such a manner as to imitate the essence or
not.
Her. Very
good.
Soc. But
are these the only primary names, or are there others?
Her.
There must be others.
Soc. So I
should expect. But how shall we further analyse them, and
where does the imitator begin?
Imitation of the essence is
made by syllables and letters;
ought we not, therefore, first to separate the letters, just
as those who are beginning rhythm first distinguish the
powers of elementary, and then of compound sounds, and when
they have done so, but not before, they proceed to the consideration of rhythms?
Her. Yes.
Soc. Must
we not begin in the same way with letters; first
separating the vowels, and then the consonants and mutes, into classes, according to the received
distinctions of the learned; also the semivowels, which are
neither vowels, nor yet mutes; and distinguishing into classes the vowels
themselves? And when we have perfected the classification of
things, we shall give their names, and see whether, as in
the case of letters, there are any classes to which they may
be all referred; hence we shall see their natures, and see,
too, whether they have in them classes as there are in the
letters; and when we have well considered all this, we shall
know how to apply them to what they resemble- whether one
letter is used to denote one thing, or whether there is to
be an admixture of several of them; just, as in painting,
the painter who wants to depict anything sometimes uses
purple only, or any other colour, and sometimes mixes up
several colours, as his method is when he has to paint flesh
colour or anything of that kind- he uses his colours as his
figures appear to require them; and so, too, we shall apply
letters to the expression of objects, either single letters
when required, or several letters; and so we shall form
syllables, as they are called, and from syllables make nouns
and verbs; and thus, at last, from the combinations of nouns
and verbs arrive at language, large and fair and whole; and
as the painter made a figure, even so shall we make speech
by the art of the namer or the rhetorician, or
by some other art. Not that I am literally speaking of
ourselves, but I was carried away- meaning to say that this
was the way in which (not we but) the ancients formed
language, and what they put together we must take to pieces
in like manner, if we are to attain a scientific view of the
whole subject, and we must see whether the primary, and also
whether the secondary elements are rightly given or not, for
if they are not, the composition of them, my dear
Hermogenes, will be a sorry piece of work, and in the wrong
direction.
Her.
That, Socrates, I can quite believe.
Soc.
Well, but do you suppose that you will be able to analyse
them in this way? for I am certain that I should not.
Her. Much
less am I likely to be able.
Soc.
Shall we leave them, then? or shall we seek to discover, if
we can, something about them, according to the measure of
our ability, saying by way of preface, as I said before of
the Gods, that of the truth about them we know nothing, and
do but entertain human notions of them. And in this present
enquiry, let us say to ourselves, before we proceed, that
the higher method is the one which we or others who would
analyse language to any good purpose must follow; but under
the circumstances, as men say, we must do as well as we can.
What do you think?
Her. I very much approve.
Soc. That
objects should be imitated in letters and syllables, and so
find expression, may appear ridiculous, Hermogenes, but it
cannot be avoided- there is no better principle to which we
can look for the truth of first names.
Deprived of this, we must have
recourse to divine help, like the tragic poets,
who in any perplexity have their Gods waiting in the air;
and must get out of our difficulty in like fashion, by
saying that "the Gods gave the first names, and therefore
they are right."
This will be the best contrivance, or
perhaps that other notion may be even better still,
of deriving them from some barbarous people, for the barbarians
are older than we are; or we may say that
antiquity has cast a veil over them, which is the same sort of excuse as the
last;
for all these are not reasons but only ingenious excuses for having no reasons concerning the truth
of words.
And yet any sort of ignorance of first or primitive names involves an ignorance
of secondary words; for
they can only be explained by the primary.
Clearly then the professor of
languages should be able to give a very lucid explanation of first names, or let him be assured he
will only talk nonsense
about the rest. Do you
not suppose this to be true?
Strabo Geography 10.3.13 Barbarians.
Her.
Certainly, Socrates.
Soc. My
first notions of original names are truly wild and
ridiculous, though I have no objection to impart them to you
if you desire, and I hope that you will communicate to me in
return anything better which you may have.
Her. Fear
not; I will do my best.
Soc. In
the first place, the letter r; appears to me to be the
general instrument expressing all motion (kinesis). But I
have not yet explained the meaning of this latter word,
which is just iesis (going); for the letter e (long) was not
in use among the ancients, who only employed e (short); and
the root is kiein, which is a foreign form, the same as
ienai. And the old word kinesis will be correctly given as
iesis in corresponding modern letters. Assuming this foreign
root kiein, and allowing for the change of the e and the
insertion of the n, we have kinesis, which should have been
kieinsis or eisis; and stasis is the negative of ienai (or
eisis), and has been improved into stasis.
Now the letter r, as I was saying,
appeared to the imposer of names an excellent instrument for
the expression of motion; and he frequently uses the letter
for this purpose: for example, in the actual words rein and
roe he represents motion by r; also in the words
tromos
(trembling), trachus (rugged); and again, in words such as krouein
(strike), thrauein (crush), ereikein (bruise), thruptein (break), kermatixein (crumble), rumbein (whirl): of all these sorts of movements he
generally finds an expression in the letter r, because, as
I imagine, he had observed that the tongue was most
agitated and least at rest in the pronunciation of this
letter, which he therefore used in order to express motion,
just as by the letter i he expresses the subtle elements
which pass through all things.
This is why he uses the letter i as
imitative of motion, ienai, iesthai. And there is another class
of letters, ph, ps, s, and x, of which the pronunciation
is accompanied by great
expenditure of breath;
these are used in the imitation of such notions as psuchron
(shivering), xeon (seething), seiesthai, (to be shaken), seismos
(shock), and are always introduced by the giver of names
when he wants to imitate what is phusodes
(windy). He seems to have thought that the closing and
pressure of the tongue in the utterance of d and t was
expressive of binding and rest in a place: he further
observed the liquid movement of l, in the pronunciation of
which the tongue slips, and in this he found the
expression of smoothness, as in leios
(level), and in the word oliothanein (to slip) itself, liparon
(sleek), in the word kollodes (gluey), and the like:
the heavier sound of g detained the slipping tongue, and the union of the two gave the notion
of a glutinous clammy
nature, as in glischros,
glukus, gloiodes.
The n he observed to be sounded from
within, and therefore to have a notion of inwardness;
hence he introduced the sound in endos and entos: a he
assigned to the expression of size, and n of length,
because they are great letters: o was the sign of
roundness, and therefore there is plenty of o mixed up
in the word goggulon (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing
all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on
them names and signs, and out of them by imitation
compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of
the truth of names; but I should like to hear what
Cratylus has more to say.
Her. But,
Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies
me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never
explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether
his obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus,
here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what
Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something
better of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view
is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates
and I will learn of you.
Crat.
Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you
can learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a
moment; at any rate, not such a subject as language, which
is, perhaps, the very greatest of all.
Her. No,
indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, "to add
little to little" is worth while. And, therefore, if you
think that you can add anything at all, however small, to
our knowledge, take a little trouble and oblige Socrates,
and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you.
Soc. I am
by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes
and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to
say what you think, which if it be better than my own view
shall gladly accept. And I should not be at all surprised to
find that you have found some better notion. For you have
evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers,
and if you have really a better theory of the truth of
names, you may count me in the number of your disciples.
Crat. You
are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of
these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a
disciple. But I fear that the opposite is more probable, and
I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in
the "Prayers" says to Ajax-
Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord
of the people, You appear to have spoken in all things
much to my mind. And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an
oracle, and to give answers much to my whether you are
inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have
long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously
to yourself.
Soc.
Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own
wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to
stop and ask myself What am I saying? for there is nothing
worse than self-deception- when the deceiver is always at
home and always with you- it is quite terrible, and
therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to
"look fore and aft," in the words of the aforesaid Homer.
And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been saying
that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:-
has this proposition been sufficiently proven?
Crat.
Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is
quite true.
Soc.
Names, then, are given in order to instruct?
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And
naming is an art, and has
artificers?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And
who are they?
Crat. The
legislators, of whom you spoke at first.
Soc. And
does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me
explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some
worse?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. The
better painters execute their works, I mean their figures,
better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders
also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse
build them worse.
Crat.
True.
Soc. And
among legislators, there are some who do their work better
and some worse?
Crat. No;
there I do not agree with you.
Soc. Then
you do not think that some laws are better and others worse?
Crat. No,
indeed.
Soc. Or
that one name is better than another?
Crat.
Certainly not.
Soc. Then
all names are rightly imposed?
Crat.
Yes, if they are names at all.
Soc.
Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes,
which was mentioned before:- assuming that he has nothing of
the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong
name, or not his name at all?
Crat. I
should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but
only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody
else, who has the nature which corresponds to it.
Soc. And
if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even
speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can
call him Hermogenes, if he is not.
Crat.
What do you mean?
Soc. Are
you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is
your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages.
Crat.
Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?- say
something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying
the thing which is not?
Soc. Your
argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I
should like to know whether you are one of those
philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not
said?
Crat. Neither spoken nor said.
Soc. Nor uttered nor addressed? For
example: If a person, saluting you in a foreign country,
were to take your hand and say: "Hail, Athenian stranger,
Hermogenes, son of Smicrion"- these words, whether spoken,
said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to
you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody
at all?
Crat. In my opinion, Socrates, the
speaker would only be talking nonsense.
Soc. Well, but that will be quite
enough for me, if you will tell me whether the nonsense
would be true or false, or partly true and partly false:-
which is all that I want to know.
Crat. I should say that he would be
putting himself in motion to no purpose; and that his words
would be an unmeaning sound like the noise of hammering at a brazen pot.
See Speaking in Tongues. Compare 1
Corinthians 13:1
Soc. But
let us see, Cratylus, whether we cannot find a
meeting-point, for you would admit that the name is not the
same with the thing named?
Crat. I
should.
Soc. And
would you further acknowledge that the name is an imitation of the thing?
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And
you would say that pictures are also imitations of things,
but in another way?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. I
believe you may be right, but I do not rightly understand
you. Please to say, then, whether both sorts of imitation (I
mean both pictures or words) are not equally attributable
and applicable to the things of which they are the
imitation.
Crat.
They are.
Soc.
First look at the matter thus: you may attribute the
likeness of the man to the man, and of the woman to the
woman; and so on?
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And
conversely you may attribute the likeness of the man to the
woman, and of the woman to the man?
Crat.
Very true.
Soc. And
are both modes of assigning them right, or only the first?
Crat.
Only the first.
Soc. That
is to say, the mode of assignment which attributes to each
that which belongs to them and is like them?
Crat.
That is my view.
Soc. Now
then, as I am desirous that we being friends should have a
good understanding about the argument, let me state my view
to you: the first mode of assignment, whether applied to
figures or to names, I call right, and when applied to names
only, true as well as right; and the other mode of giving
and assigning the name which is unlike, I call wrong, and in
the case of names, false as well as wrong.
Crat.
That may be true, Socrates, in the case of pictures; they
may be wrongly assigned; but not in the case of names- they
must be always right.
Soc. Why,
what is the difference? May I not go to a man and say to
him, "This is your picture," showing him his own likeness,
or perhaps the likeness of a woman; and when I say "show," I
mean bring before the sense of sight.
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And
may I not go to him again, and say, "This is your name"?-
for the name, like the picture, is an imitation. May I not
say to him- "This is your name"? and may I not then bring to
his sense of hearing the imitation of himself, when I say,
"This is a man"; or of a female of the human species, when I
say, "This is a woman," as the case may be? Is not all that
quite possible?
Crat. I
would fain agree with you, Socrates; and therefore I say,
Granted.
Soc. That
is very good of you, if I am right, which need hardly be
disputed at present. But if I can assign names as well as
pictures to objects, the right assignment of them we may
call truth, and the wrong assignment of them falsehood. Now
if there be such a wrong assignment of names, there may also
be a wrong or inappropriate assignment of verbs; and if of
names and verbs then of the sentences, which are made up of
them. What do you say, Cratylus?
Crat. I
agree; and think that what you say is very true.
Soc. And
further, primitive nouns may be compared to pictures, and in
pictures you may either give all the appropriate colours and
figures, or you may not give them all- some may be wanting;
or there may be too many or too much of them- may there not?
Crat.
Very true.
Soc. And
he who gives all gives a perfect picture or figure; and he
who takes away or adds also gives a picture or figure, but
not a good one.
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. In
like manner, he who by syllables and letters imitates the
nature of things, if he gives all that is appropriate will
produce a good image, or in other words a name; but if he
subtracts or perhaps adds a little, he will make an image
but not a good one; whence I infer that some names are well
and others ill made.
Crat.
That is true.
Soc. Then
the artist of names may be sometimes good, or he may be bad?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And
this artist of names is called the legislator?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. Then
like other artists the legislator may be good or he may be
bad; it must surely be so if our former admissions hold
good?
Crat.
Very true, Socrates; but the case of language, you
see, is different; for when by the help of grammar we assign
the letters a or b, or any other letters to a certain name,
then, if we add, or subtract, or misplace a letter, the name
which is written is not only written wrongly, but not
written at all; and in any of these cases becomes other than
a name.
Soc. But
I doubt whether your view is altogether correct, Cratylus.
Crat. How
so?
Soc. I
believe that what you say may be true about numbers, which
must be just what they are, or not be at all; for example,
the number ten at once becomes other than ten if a unit be
added or subtracted, and so of any other number: but this
does not apply to that which is qualitative or to anything
which is represented under an image. I should say rather
that the image, if expressing in every point the entire
reality, would no longer be an image. Let us suppose the existence of two objects:
one of them shall be Cratylus, and the other the image of
Cratylus; and we will suppose, further, that some God makes
not only a representation such as a painter would make of
your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward
organization like yours, having the same warmth and
softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind,
such as you have, in a word copies all your qualities, and
places them by you in another form; would you say that this
was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were
two Cratyluses?
Crat. I
should say that there were two Cratyluses.
Soc. Then
you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle
of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that
an image is no longer an image when something is added or
subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far
from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the
realities which they represent?
Crat.
Yes, I see.
Soc. But
then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things,
if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be
the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine
which were the names and which were the realities.
Crat.
Quite true.
Soc. Then
fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be
correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist
that the name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but
allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if
of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun
in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to
the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and
described, so long as the general character of the thing
which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will
remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the
particular instance of the names of the letters.
Crat.
Yes, I remember.
Soc.
Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if
some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is
signified;- well, if all the letters are given; not well,
when only a few of them are given. I think that we had
better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in
Aegina who wander about the street late at night: and be
likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too
late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of
correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is
the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if
you say both, you will be inconsistent with yourself.
Crat. I
quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very
reasonable.
Soc. Then
as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a
name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters.
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And
the proper letters are those which are like the things?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc.
Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names
which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be
supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or
there would be no likeness; but there will be likewise a
part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation
of the word: you would admit that?
Crat.
There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you,
since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly
given is a name at all.
Soc. Do
you admit a name to be the representation of a thing?
Crat.
Yes, I do.
Soc. But
do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some
derived?
Crat.
Yes, I do.
Soc. Then
if you admit that primitive or first nouns are
representations of things, is there any better way of
framing representations than by assimilating them to the
objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the notion of
Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are
conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed
about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things
intended by them, and that convention is the only principle;
and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a
new and opposite one, according to which you call small
great and great small- that, they would say, makes no
difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two
notions do you prefer?
Crat.
Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better
than representation by any chance sign.
Soc. Very
good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters
out of which the first names are composed must also be like
things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask,
How could any one ever compose a picture which would be like
anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which
resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture
is composed?
Crat.
Impossible.
Soc. No
more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing,
unless the original elements of which they are compounded
bore some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the
names are the imitation: And the original elements are
letters?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. Let
me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were
saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter r
is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we
right or wrong in saying so?
Crat. I
should say that you were right.
Soc. And
that l was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the
like?
Crat.
There again you were right.
Soc. And
yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us sklerotes,
is by the Eretrians called skleroter.
Crat.
Very true.
Soc. But
are the letters r and s, equivalents; and is there the same
significance to them in the termination r, which there is to
us in s, or is there no significance to one of us?
Crat.
Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us.
Soc. In
as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike?
Crat. In
as far as they are like.
Soc. Are
they altogether alike?
Crat.
Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion.
Soc. And
what do you say of the insertion of the l? for that is
expressive not of hardness but of softness.
Crat.
Why, perhaps the letter l is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and
should be altered into r, as you were saying to Hermogenes
and in my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and
subtracting letters upon occasion.
Soc.
Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when
I say skleros (hard), you know what I mean.
Crat.
Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom.
Soc. And
what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I
understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of
the sound: this is what you are saying?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. And
if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication
given by me to you?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. This
indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as
from like, for example in the l of sklerotes. But if this is
true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the
correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since
letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those
which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and
convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom
from convention ever so much, still you must say that the
signification of words is given by custom and not by
likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as
by the like.
But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus
(for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then
custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the
indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance
of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that
you will find names resembling every individual number,
unless you allow that which you term convention and
agreement to have authority in determining the correctness
of names? I quite agree with you that words should as far as
possible resemble things; but I fear that this dragging in
of resemblance, as Hermogenes says, is a shabby thing, which
has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention
with a view to correctness; for I believe that if we could
always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are
perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect state
of language; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let
me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use
of them?
Crat. The
use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform:
the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the
things which are expressed by them.
Soc. I
suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so
also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also
know the other, because they are similars, and all similars
fall under the same art or science; and therefore you would
say that he who knows names will also know things.
Crat.
That is precisely what I mean.
Soc. But
let us consider what is the nature of this information about
things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it
the best sort of information? or is there any other? What do
you say?
Crat. I
believe that to be both the only and the best sort of
information about them; there can be no other.
Soc. But
do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who
discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this
only the method of instruction, and is there some other
method of enquiry and discovery.
Crat. I
certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery
are of the same nature as instruction.
Soc.
Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows
names in the search after things, and analyses their
meaning, is in great danger of being deceived?
Crat. How
so?
Soc. Why
clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his
conception of the things which they signified- did he not?
Crat.
True.
Soc. And
if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according
to his conception, in what position shall we who are his
followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him?
Crat.
But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must
surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would
not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has
not missed the truth, and the proof is- that he is perfectly
consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all the
words which you utter have a common character and purpose?
Soc. But
that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in
error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with
the original error and with himself; there would be nothing
strange in this, any more than in geometrical diagrams,
which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first
part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the
long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why
every man should expend his chief thought and attention on
the consideration of his first principles:- are they or are
they not rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted
them, all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished
to find that names are really consistent. And here let us
revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that all
things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this
idea of motion is expressed by names? Do you not conceive
that to be the meaning of them?
Crat.
Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning.
Soc. Let
us revert to episteme (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous
this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at
things than going round with them; and therefore we should
leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the e, but
make an insertion of an instead of an i (not pioteme, but
epiisteme). Take another example: bebaion (sure)
is clearly the expression of station and position, and not
of motion. Again, the word istoria (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping
(istanai) of the stream; and the word piston
(faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then,
again, mneme (memory), as any one may see, expresses rest
in the soul, and not motion.
Moreover, words such as amartia and sumphora, which
have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies
will be the same as sunesis
and episteme and other words
which have a good sense (i.e., omartein, sunienai,
epesthai, sumphersthai) and much the same may be said of
amathia and akolaia, for amathia may be explained as e ama theo iontos poreia,
and akolasia as e akolouthia tois pragmasin. Thus the names
which in these instances we find to have the worst sense,
will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those
which have the best. And any one I believe who would take
the trouble might find many other examples in which the
giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or
progress, but that they are at rest; which is the opposite
of motion.
Crat.
Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express
motion.
Soc. What
of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is
correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to
say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true
ones?
Crat. No;
that is not reasonable.
Soc.
Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and
proceed to another, about which I should like to know
whether you think with me. Were we not lately acknowledging
that the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and
barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave
names was the art of the legislator?
Crat.
Quite true.
Soc. Tell
me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of
the first names, know or not know the things which they
named?
Crat.
They must have known, Socrates.
Soc. Why,
yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant.
Crat. I
should say not.
Soc. Let
us return to the point from which we digressed. You were
saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have
known the things which he named; are you still of that
opinion?
Crat. I
am.
Soc. And
would you say that the giver of the first names had also a
knowledge of the things which he named?
Crat. I
should.
Soc. But
how could he have learned or discovered things from names if
the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are
correct in our view, the only way of learning and
discovering things, is either to discover names for
ourselves or to learn them from others.
Crat. I
think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates.
Soc. But
if things are only to be known through names, how can we
suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were
legislators before there were names at all, and therefore
before they could have known them?
Crat. I
believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be,
that a power more than human gave things their first names,
and that the names which are thus given are necessarily
their true names.
Soc. Then
how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being
or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just
now that he made some names expressive of rest and others of
motion? Were we mistaken?
Crat. But
I suppose one of the two not to be names at all.
Soc. And
which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are
expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion?
This is a point which, as I said before, cannot be
determined by counting them.
Crat. No;
not in that way, Socrates.
Soc. But
if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that
they are like the truth, others contending that they are,
how or by what criterion are we to decide between them? For
there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but
obviously recourse must be had to another standard which,
without employing names, will make clear which of the two
are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth
of things.
Crat. I
agree.
Soc. But
if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be
known without names?
Crat.
Clearly.
Soc. But
how would you expect to know them? What other way can there
be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through
their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and
through themselves? For that which is other and different
from them must signify something other and different from
them.
Crat.
What you are saying is, I think, true.
Soc.
Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged
that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of
the things which they name?
Crat.
Yes.
Soc. Let
us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn
things through the medium of names, and suppose also that
you can learn them from the things themselves- which is
likely to be the nobler and clearer way to learn of the
image, whether the image and the truth of which the image is
the expression have been rightly conceived, or to learn of
the truth whether the truth and the image of it have been
duly executed?
Crat. I
should say that we must learn of the truth.
Soc. How
real existence is to be studied or discovered is, I suspect,
beyond you and me. But we may admit so much, that the
knowledge of things is not to be derived from names. No;
they must be studied and investigated in themselves.
Crat.
Clearly, Socrates.
Soc.
There is another point. I should not like us to be imposed
upon by the appearance of such a multitude of names, all
tending in the same direction. I myself do not deny that the
givers of names did really give them under the idea that all
things were in motion and flux; which was their sincere but,
I think, mistaken opinion. And having fallen into a kind of
whirlpool themselves, they are carried round, and want to
drag us in after them. There is a matter, master Cratylus,
about which I often dream, and should like to ask your
opinion: Tell me, whether there is or is not any absolute
beauty or good, or any other absolute existence?
Crat.
Certainly, Socrates, I think so.
Soc. Then
let us seek the true beauty: not asking whether a face is
fair, or anything of that sort, for all such things appear
to be in a flux; but let us ask whether the true beauty is
not always beautiful.
Crat.
Certainly.
Soc. And
can we rightly speak of a beauty which is always passing
away, and is first this and then that; must not the same
thing be born and retire and vanish while the word is in our
mouths?
Crat.
Undoubtedly.
Soc. Then
how can that be a real thing which is never in the same
state? I for obviously things which are the same cannot
change while they remain the same; and if they are always
the same and in the same state, and never depart from their
original form, they can never change or be moved.
Crat.
Certainly they cannot.
Soc. Nor
yet can they be known by any one; for at the moment that the
observer approaches, then they become other and of another
nature, so that you cannot get any further in knowing their
nature or state, for you cannot know that which has no
state.
Crat.
True.
Soc. Nor
can we reasonably say, Cratylus, that there is knowledge at
all,
if everything is in a
state of transition and there is nothing abiding;
for knowledge too
cannot continue to be knowledge
unless continuing always to abide and
exist.
But if the very nature of knowledge changes,
at the time when
the change occurs there will be no knowledge;
and if the transition
is always going on, there will always be no knowledge,
and, according to this
view,
there will be no
one to know and nothing to be known:
but if that which knows and that which is known
exist ever,
and the
beautiful and the good and every other thing also exist,
then I do not think
that they can resemble a process or flux, as we were just
now supposing.
Whether there is this eternal nature in things,
or whether the truth
is what Heracleitus and his followers and many others say,
is a question hard to
determine;
and no man of sense
will like to put himself
or the education of
his mind in the power of names:
neither will he so far
trust names or the givers of names
as to be confident in any
knowledge which condemns himself
and other existences
to an unhealthy state of unreality;
he will not believe that all things leak like a pot,
or imagine that the
world is a man who has a running at the nose.
This may be true, Cratylus, but is also
very likely to be untrue;
and therefore I would
not have you be too easily persuaded of it.
Reflect well and like a man, and
do not easily accept such a doctrine;
for you are young and
of an age to learn.
And when you have
found the truth, come and tell me.
Crat. I
will do as you say, though I can assure you, Socrates,
that I have been
considering the matter already,
and the result
of a great deal of trouble and consideration is that I
incline to Heracleitus.
Soc.
Then, another day, my friend, when you come back, you shall
give me a lesson; but at present, go into the country, as
you are intending, and Hermogenes shall set you on your way.
Crat.
Very good, Socrates; I hope, however, that you will continue
to think about these things yourself.
THE END
Classical
Index
Musical
Worship Index
Home Page
Counter added 11/09/04 2020
Rev 3.11.07 412
Lost counter 5.19.08
<a href="https://www.hitwebcounter.com" target="_blank">
<img
src="https://hitwebcounter.com/counter/counter.php?page=8001991&style=0032&nbdigits=5&type=ip&initCount=0"
title="Free Counter" Alt="web counter" border="0"
/></a>